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GOLD MEDALIST TO CHEATER?: IMPROVING THE 
WORLD’S FIGHT AGAINST DOPING IN THE WAKE OF 
FINA V. CIELO 
INTRODUCTION 
At the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing, China, Brazilian swimmer César 
Cielo Filho (“Cielo”) lunged into the wall first in fifty-meter freestyle, 
finishing in 21.30 seconds, an Olympic-record time.1 In victory, Cielo thrust 
his fists into the air and repeatedly slammed them into the water, splashing 
with wild gesticulations.2 A half-minute later, he became more subdued and 
slid back into the water, hugging the lane line as tears welled in his eyes.3 After 
years of training and unwavering commitment to the sport of swimming, he 
had finally become the fastest swimmer in the world and an Olympic gold 
medalist. 
Three years later, while competing in Brazil two months before the 2011 
Fédération Internationale de Natation (“FINA”) World Championships, Cielo 
found both his reputation and swimming future in jeopardy. At a Brazilian 
national swimming competition, Cielo and three of his teammates tested 
positive for the banned substance furosemide,4 a diuretic that can mask the 
presence of performance-enhancing drugs in a biological system.5 Under the 
World Anti-Doping Code (“WADC”), to which all swimmers who compete at 
the international level must adhere,6 Cielo faced up to a two-year period of 
 
 1 John Lohn, Olympics, Swimming: Cesar Cielo Claims 50 Free Gold in Olympic Record Time, 
SWIMMINGWORLD (Aug. 15, 2008), http://www.swimmingworldmagazine.com/lane9/news/18845.asp. 
 2 See id. 
 3 Cielo Hands Brazil First Swimming Gold, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Aug. 16, 2008), http://olympics. 
scmp.com/Article.aspx?id=2745; Ariel Pietrobond, Mens 50M Freestyle Final—Hombres 50M Estilo Libre 
Final Beijing 2008, YOUTUBE (Dec. 4, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xqfFT58tubQ. 
 4 Cesar Cielo Cleared To Defend World Titles After CAS Hearing, GUARDIAN (July 21, 2011), http:// 
www.guardian.co.uk/sport/2011/jul/21/cesar-cielo-cas-hearing. 
 5 See Amy B Cadwallader et al., The Abuse of Diuretics as Performance-Enhancing Drugs and Masking 
Agents in Sport Doping: Pharmacology, Toxicology and Analysis, 161 BRIT. J. PHARMACOLOGY 1, 1, 7, 9 
(2010). 
 6 See Scope: Doping Control Rules, FINA, http://www.fina.org/H2O/index.php?option=com_content& 
view=article&id=382:scope&catid=90:doping-control-rules&Itemid=184 (last visited Jan. 5, 2013); 
Whereabouts / ADAMS, FINA, http://www.fina.org/project/index.php?option=com_content&task=blog 
category&id=121&Itemid=554 (last visited Jan. 5, 2013). 
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ineligibility from the sport.7 Such a sanction would have prohibited him from 
competing in the 2012 Summer Olympic Games in London and potentially 
cost him millions of dollars in endorsement deals.8 
In response to his positive drug test, Cielo vehemently denied using any 
banned substances to improve his performance. On his website, he claimed 
innocence, stressing both that he ingested trace amounts of furosemide through 
a cross-contaminated supplement and that he took every precaution with 
drugs.9 Despite his claims, Cielo’s fate hung with the adjudicatory authorities 
that oversee the sanctioning of athletes who test positive for banned 
substances.10 In the past decade, these tribunals, particularly the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”), which hears many appeals on anti-doping issues 
each year, have heard many athletes argue that they failed a drug test because 
they ingested the banned substance via a contaminated dietary supplement.11 
Although, in many of these cases, the athlete probably received little athletic 
benefit from the banned substance due to its small amount, the CAS had still 
imposed a significant sanction, such as a one- or two-year period of 
ineligibility from competition.12 
When the CAS reached its final decision regarding Cielo, which is 
discussed in Part III of this Comment, many swimmers at the World 
Championships expressed serious discontent with the decision. Australia’s 
Commonwealth Game champion Geoff Huegill tweeted incredulously, 
 
 7 See WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE DC10.2, at 52 (2009) [hereinafter 
2009 WADC], available at http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/code_v2009_En.pdf. 
 8 Cf. Alex Miller, A Pot of Gold! How Britain’s Athletes Will Cash in if They Grab Glory at the London 
Games, MAIL ONLINE (Nov. 5, 2011), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/olympics/article-2058031/London-
2012-How-Britains-athletes-cash-in.html. 
 9 Warnings Given to Cesar Cielo, Three Other Brazilian Swimmers, After Positive Drug Test, 
SWIMMINGWORLD, http://www.swimmingworldmagazine.com/lane9/news/27408.asp (last updated July 3, 
2011) (“I consider myself an exemplary athlete in this regard.” (translating and quoting Cielo) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 10 Fédération Internationale de Natation v. Cielo, CAS 2011/A/2495, Arbitral Award, para. 8.32 (Ct. Arb. 
Sport 2011), available at http://www.tas-cas.org/d2wfiles/document/5094/5048/0/CAS2024952024962024972 
0249820Award20FINAL20292007202011.pdf. 
 11 See, e.g., World Anti-Doping Agency v. Hardy, CAS 2009/A/1870, Arbitral Award, para. 111 (Ct. 
Arb. Sport 2010), available at http://www.tas-cas.org/d2wfiles/document/4218/5048/0/Award20187020 
FINAL.pdf; Vencill v. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, CAS 2003/A/484, Arbitral Award, paras. 40, 61 (Ct. Arb. 
Sport 2004), available at http://www.usada.org/files/active/arbitration_rulings/arbitration_ruling_3_17_2004_ 
Vencill.pdf. 
 12 Hardy, CAS 2009/A/1870, para. 129; Vencill, CAS 2003/A/484, para. 63. 
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“WTF.” 13 Other athletes directed their frustration directly at the World Anti-
Doping Agency (“WADA”) that administers the WADC. For example, Italy’s 
Filippo Magnini, a two-time world champion, commented, “I’m convinced 
[Cielo] is a champion, no matter what . . . it’s the system that doesn’t work.”14 
Magnini’s statement is of particular interest to this Comment, as Cielo’s case 
illustrates the shortcomings of the anti-doping system. 
Framed around Cielo’s case, this Comment advocates that the WADC must 
be redrafted to create a fairer and more understandable anti-doping system. 
This Comment contains four Parts. Part I provides background context 
regarding the international athletic community’s fight against performance-
enhancing drugs. Tracing the history of anti-doping efforts, Part I describes the 
structure and function of the various non-governmental entities that oversee the 
regulation of athletes. Part II presents the 2003 WADC, the world’s first 
attempt to harmonize the doping laws and regulations for all athletes who 
compete at the international level. Part III explores how the 2003 WADC 
changed when it was amended in 2009 and analyzes how these changes 
affected the outcome of Cielo’s case. Finally, Part IV proposes several ways to 
improve the doping regulation system in light of Cielo. Part IV argues that the 
CAS reached a fair result in Cielo, yet its decision lacked reasoning that could 
have quelled public dissatisfaction over Cielo’s sanction. Additionally, Part IV 
recommends two ways that WADA can improve the WADC and one way that 
CAS panels can improve their reasoning in their opinions. Together, these 
steps would reshape the world’s fight against doping and create a system that is 
clearer, fairer, and more understandable to the public. 
I. BACKGROUND ON THE FIGHT AGAINST DOPING 
Sport is a global enterprise.15 The most apparent example of the globalized 
athletic endeavor is the Olympics, where thousands of athletes descend upon 
one city to compete for gold once every four years. But the Olympics are just 
 
 13 Jessica Halloran, Brazilian Swimmer Cesar Cielo Let Off with Warning Despite Positive Test, HERALD 
SUN (July 2, 2011), http://heraldsun.com.au/sport/brazilian-swimmer-cesar-cielo-let-off-with-warning-despite-
positive-test/story-e6frfglf-1226086072213 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 14 Andrew Dampf, Cielo’s Rivals Concerned About CAS Ruling, SEATTLE TIMES (July 23, 2011), 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/sports/2015703621_apswmworldsdoping.html. 
 15 WALTER T. CHAMPION, JR., SPORTS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 248 (West Group 2d ed. 2000). 
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one of many international competitions; today, international competitions 
occur on a consistent basis for most sports.16 
With the increase in international sporting events, unique challenges have 
arisen.17 Chief among these challenges has been the regulation of drug usage 
and blood doping (collectively “doping”).18 Indeed, in 2002, Jacques Rogges, 
President of the International Olympic Committee (“IOC”), stated that doping 
was the number one issue facing his organization.19 To combat doping, the 
international community has developed an extensive hierarchy of governing 
and regulatory bodies to monitor athletes, promulgate regulatory codes, and 
adjudicate cases. 
A. International Governing Bodies of Sport 
A complex hierarchy of organizations oversees the international athletic 
community.20 This Subpart provides an overview of this structure, describing 
the role of the IOC, National Olympic Committees (“NOCs”), International 
Federations (“IFs”), and National Governing Bodies (“NGBs”) in the fight 
against doping. 
An analysis of the international governing bodies of sport begins with the 
IOC. Created in June 1894, the IOC is a non-governmental organization tasked 
with promoting sport as a vehicle for social responsibility and respect for 
fundamental ethical principles.21 Although it lacks official government status, 
the IOC maintains a legal personality, such that “[s]tates acquiesce in its 
 
 16 Other international competitions include, inter alia, the World Championships, Pan American Games, 
and the Pan Pacific Swimming Championships. E.g., About Us, PAN PAC. SWIMMING, http://www. 
panpacificswimming.com (last visited Nov. 2, 2012); Pan American Games, ESPN (Nov. 21, 2011, 1:23 PM), 
http://espn.go.com/oly/topics/_/page/pan-american-games; INT’L ASS’N ATHLETICS FED’NS, http://daegu2011. 
iaaf.org/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2012). 
 17 See Rebecca Mowrey, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Negotiation, Mediation, and Arbitration, in 
LAW FOR RECREATION AND SPORT MANAGERS 44, 52 (Doyice J. Cotton & John T. Wolohan eds., 3d ed. 
2003). 
 18 International Convention Against Doping in Sport, art. 1, Annex I, Oct. 19, 2005, S. TREATY DOC. 
110-14, 2419 U.N.T.S. 201. (“The purpose of this Convention . . . is to promote the prevention of and the fight 
against doping in sport, with a view to its elimination.”). “Blood doping,” also known as “blood boosting,” 
involves the removal and subsequent re-injection of an athlete’s blood in order to increase the number of red 
blood cells within the athlete’s body. A Brief History of Anti-Doping, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, http:// 
www.wada-ama.org/en/About-WADA/History/A-Brief-History-of-Anti-Doping (last updated June 2010) 
[hereinafter History of Anti-Doping]. 
 19 Christopher Clarey, I.O.C. Chief Keeps Links to Nations Balanced, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2002, at G11. 
 20 See CHAMPION, supra note 15, at 248–50. 
 21 Int’l Olympic Comm., Olympic Charter, pmbl., r. 2 [hereinafter Olympic Charter], available at http:// 
www.olympic.org/Documents/olympic_charter_en.pdf. 
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decisions and conduct diplomacy with it.”22 Domestic courts, including the 
Supreme Court of the United States, have deferred to the IOC in international 
athletic issues.23 The IOC oversees the global agenda for anti-doping measures, 
but it relies on two kinds of organizations to promote them (and the principles 
of the Olympic Movement more generally): NOCs, which are country-specific, 
and IFs, which are sport-specific.24 
Considering these two bodies in turn, NOCs oversee and organize a 
country’s participation in the Olympic Games.25 All NOCs must conform to 
the rules set forth in the Olympic Charter, which is promulgated by the IOC.26 
The Charter, in turn, mandates that all NOCs implement the WADC in order to 
be recognized by the IOC.27 Once the IOC has recognized an NOC, the NOC 
may have standing to appeal a case involving an athlete’s eligibility for 
participation in a competition.28 
The second type of organization that the IOC uses to promote its Charter is 
the IF. Every sport has its own IF which monitors the day-to-day 
administration of the various disciplines.29 IFs can regulate equipment 
standards, decide how many international competitions a sport can have each 
year, select judges and officials for competitions, and exercise limited 
appellate jurisdiction to review administrative decisions.30 With respect to 
doping, IFs test their athletes in and out of competitions and issue sanctions for 
 
 22 JAMES A.R. NAFZIGER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW 25 (2d ed. 2004); see also Reparation for 
Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 178–79 (Apr. 11) (describing 
“personality” as having rights, duties, and the capacity to protect its rights and discharge its duties). 
 23 S. F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 537 (1987) (noting that Congress 
had officially adopted the Olympic Charter’s Rule 1 “to spread the Olympic principles” (quoting Olympic 
Charter, supra note 21, r. 1) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 24 Olympic Charter, supra note 21, at rs. 2, 25–27. 
 25 See NAFZIGER, supra note 22, at 4–5. Currently, there are 204 NOCs in the world, representing both 
sovereign countries and non-sovereign territories. National Olympic Committees, WORLD ANTI-DOPING 
AGENCY, http://www.olympic.org/national-olympic-committees (last visited Oct. 27, 2012). 
 26 Olympic Charter, supra note 21, at r. 27. 
 27 Id.; National Olympic & Paralymic Committees, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, http://www.wada-
ama.org/en/Anti-Doping-Community/NOC--NPC (last updated July 2012). 
 28 NAFZIGER, supra note 22, at 39; see, e.g., U.S. Olympic Comm. v. Int’l Olympic Comm., CAS 
2011/O/2422, Arbitral Award (Ct. Arb. Sport 2011), available at http://www.tas-cas.org/d2wfiles/document/ 
5314/5048/0/Final20award202422.pdf. In this case, the United States Olympic Committee (“USOC”), on 
behalf of several United States athletes, successfully challenged the IOC on the validity of the “Osaka Rule,” 
which banned athletes who had been suspended for more than six months for a doping violation from the next 
Olympic Games. Id. paras. 2.2., 8.37.  
 29 Olympic Charter, supra note 21, r. 26. 
 30 NAFZIGER, supra note 22, at 21. 
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athletes who violate the WADC.31 Despite their autonomy over the 
administration of their sport, IFs must also conform to broader rules and 
principles within the Olympic Charter in order to receive IOC recognition.32 
IFs rely on NGBs to manage a sport on a national level.33 As part of their 
management, NGBs monitor the daily issues within a particular sport on the 
national playing field.34 With regard to doping, NGBs educate their athletes on 
the international rules against doping and further serve as liaisons to 
international organizations such as WADA, discussed in Part I.B.35 Still, 
despite having broad discretion to manage and monitor their athletes, NGBs 
must adhere to the rules of their respective IF.36 
B. Anti-Doping Regulatory Bodies 
Comparable to the international governing bodies, the world’s anti-doping 
regulatory organizations—the WADA and National Anti-Doping 
Organizations (“NADOs”)—are also arranged hierarchically.37 Considering the 
regulatory bodies in turn, this Subpart describes the structure and goals of the 
WADA and the NADOs as well as how these organizations interact with the 
governing bodies described in Part I.A. 
Created on November 10, 1999,38 WADA is an independent agency that 
oversees the global fight against doping in sport.39 WADA’s goals include 
 
 31 International Federations, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/Anti-
Doping-Community/IFs (last updated July 2012). 
 32 Olympic Charter, supra note 21, r. 25. 
 33 NAFZIGER, supra note 22, at 38. NGBs are also sometimes referred to as “National Federations.” See, 
e.g., Mica Matsoff, U.S. National Federations Fully Endorse Chicago 2016 and Its Urban Youth Sport 
Initiative at SportAccord, AROUND THE RINGS (Mar. 25, 2009), http://www.aroundtherings.com/articles/view. 
aspx?id=31802. 
 34 NAFZIGER, supra note 22, at 38; Ryan Connolly, Note, Balancing the Justices in Anti-Doping Law: 
The Need To Ensure Fair Athletic Competition Through Effective Anti-Doping Program vs. the Protection of 
Rights of Accused Athletes, 5 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 161, 163 (2006).  
 35 National Governing Bodies, WORLD SPORT SCI., http://www.faqs.org/sports-science/Mo-Pl/National-
Governing-Bodies.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2012). 
 36 NAFZIGER, supra note 22, at 21. 
 37 About WADA, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/About-WADA (last 
updated June 2011). 
 38 History of Anti-Doping, supra note 18. The idea for WADA developed in 1998, following a high-
profile Tour de France scandal, at the First World Conference on Doping Sport in Lausanne, Switzerland. At 
this conference, national governments, IFs, and NGBs pledged to fight the practice of doping by imposing 
two-year suspensions on athletes who tested positive for either in- and out-of-competition drug tests and by 
creating an international anti-doping agency. World Conference on Doping in Sport, Feb. 2–4, 1999, Lausanne 
Declaration, paras. 2–4 (Feb. 4, 1999), available at http://www.la84foundation.org/OlympicInformation 
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protecting the athlete’s right to participate in a drug-free sport and ensuring the 
harmonized, coordinated, and effective anti-doping measures with regard to 
detection, deterrence, and protection of doping.40 To achieve its goals, WADA 
promulgated three sets of rules: International Standards;41 Model Rules, 
Guidelines, and Protocols;42 and the WADC.43 The International Standards are 
designed to harmonize the most technical aspects of doping, including not only 
what drugs constitute “prohibited” or “specified” substances44 but also the 
protection of privacy and personal information.45 Related to the International 
Standards, the Model Rules offer guidance for IFs, NOCs, and sporting event 
coordinators in implementing drug-testing procedures.46 The WADC, the core 
document of the WADA’s World Anti-Doping Program, harmonizes anti-
doping rules, policies, and procedures of anti-doping organizations throughout 
the world.47 The WADC is the focus of Part II. 
 
Center/OlympicReview/1999/OREXXVI25/OREXXVI25g.pdf. Under the Lausanne Declaration, WADA’s 
goals are to expand out-of-competition testing, coordinate research, promote preventive actions, and 
harmonize scientific and technical standards for drug-testing analyses and equipment. Id. paras. 1–4. The 
Olympic Movement committed twenty-five million U.S. dollars to WADA’s creation. Id. para. 4. 
 39 About WADA, supra note 37. 
 40 2009 WADC, supra note 7, at 11. Much of the original 2003 WADC stemmed from the 2000 Olympic 
Movement Anti-Doping Code, which was cobbled together from many IF rules, Court of Arbitration for Sport 
rulings, and judicial holdings. NAFZIGER, supra note 22, at 161–62. 
 41 See International Standards, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/World-
Anti-Doping-Program/Sports-and-Anti-Doping-Organizations/International-Standards (last updated Oct. 
2009). 
 42 See Model Rules, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/World-Anti-Doping-
Program/Sports-and-Anti-Doping-Organizations/Model-Rules--Guidelines/Model-Rules (last updated Oct. 
2009). 
 43 See 2009 WADC, supra note 7. 
 44 For definitions of these terms, see infra Part II.D. 
 45 International Standards, supra note 41. 
 46 Model Rules, supra note 42; see, e.g., Model Rules for Major Events Organizations, WORLD ANTI-
DOPING AGENCY, Sept. 2011, available at http://www.wada-ama.org/Documents/Resources/Model_Rules/ 
WADA_Model_Rules_MEO_V2.0_EN.doc. The Model Rules, however, are merely instructive unlike the 
mandatory International Standards and the WADC. Id. 
 47 World Anti-Doping Program, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/World-
Anti-Doping-Program (last updated Oct. 2010). WADA has touted the success of the WADC, stressing that it 
is a “powerful and effective tool in the harmonization of anti-doping efforts worldwide.” World Anti-Doping 
Code, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/world-anti-doping-program/sports-and-
anti-doping-organizations/the-code (last updated May 2011). WADA claims both the growing number of 
signatories who have signed onto the WADC and the CAS’s consistent support of the WADC’s tenets are 
evidence of its efficacy. Id. With the growing acceptance of the WADC, one critic has questioned whether 
WADA has too much power, calling it “the ultimate authority on matters of drugs and sport—looming over 
[NOCs] and the national and international federations . . . and making it more difficult for those parochial 
interests to protect athletes caught doping.” Michael Sokolove, In Pursuit of Doped Excellence: The Lab 
Animal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2004, § 6 (Magazine) at 28. 
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On a national level, NADOs, such as the United States Anti-Doping 
Agency (“USADA”), assist WADA by coordinating doping control efforts 
within a specific country.48 Countries designate an NADO as the central 
authority to adopt and implement anti-doping rules, direct the collection of 
drug tests, manage test results, and conduct disciplinary hearings.49 To be 
compliant with the WADC, each NADO must agree to the tenets of the 
WADC, implement the WADC’s articles into its rules and policies, and 
enforce these rules and policies in accordance with the WADC.50 
Lest it seem that all the organizations described in Subparts I.A and I.B are 
separate, the WADC stresses that the IOC, WADA, NOCs, IFs, NGBs, and 
NADOs all participate in some aspect of the doping control process.51 Cielo’s 
case, for example, illustrates the interplay of the various organizations. The 
Confederação Brasileira de Desportos Aquáticos (“CBDA”), the Brazilian 
NGB for aquatic sports, presided over his case initially, but because it was 
dissatisfied with the NGB’s decision, FINA, the IF for swimming, appealed to 
the CAS.52 
C. The Adjudication of Doping Violations 
As discussed in the previous Subpart, a two-tiered adjudicatory system 
exists for doping disputes. Typically, these tiers include a hearing by a local 
tribunal, which can be a federation or a sports-related body,53 and an appeal 
before the CAS—an independent, centralized, and specialized adjudicatory 
authority located in Lausanne, Switzerland.54 This Comment discusses the 
 
 48 NAFZIGER, supra note 22, at 161–62. Regional Anti-Doping Organizations (“RADOs”) perform 
similar functions as NADOs. RADOs unite countries and stakeholders in a specific geographical area in order 
to pool resources for anti-doping efforts. Currently, WADA has established fifteen RADOs, which serve 121 
countries. Regional Anti-Doping Organizations, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, http://www.wada-ama.org/ 
en/Anti-Doping-Community/RADOs (last updated Oct. 2012). 
 49 2009 WADC, supra note 7, app. 1, at 131. If a country has not designated a NADO, the NOC shall be 
the country’s NADO. Id. 
 50 Compliance Process, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/Anti-Doping-
Community/NADOs/Compliance-process/ (last updated Oct. 2009). 
 51 2009 WADC, supra note 7, app. § 1, at 126. 
 52 Fédération Internationale de Natation v. Cielo, CAS 2011/A/2495, Arbitral Award, para. 1.1, 2.3, 7.6 
(Ct. Arb. Sport 2011), available at http://www.tas-cas.org/d2wfiles/document/5094/5048/0/CAS20249520249 
620249720249820Award20FINAL20292007202011.pdf. 
 53 Court of Arbitration for Sport, CODE OF SPORTS-RELATED ARBITRATION statute S20(b) (2011) 
[hereinafter CAS CODE], available at www.tas-cas.org/d2wfiles/document/4962/5048/0/Code20201220_en_ 
2001.01.pdf.  
 54 NAFZIGER, supra note 22, at 40. The CAS also resolves cases through mediation. What is the Function 
of the CAS?, CT. ARB. SPORT, http://www.tas-cas.org/20question (last visited Feb. 9, 2012). The CAS has two 
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findings of several local tribunals, but it concentrates on appellate hearings 
before the CAS. 
Although nominally a “court,” the CAS is an arbitral tribunal that, pursuant 
to the Olympic Charter, has broad jurisdiction over all activities pertaining to 
sport, including appellate jurisdiction over doping-related disputes.55 In doping 
cases, WADA, IFs, NOCs, and athletes may all seek appeal from the CAS.56 
When a doping dispute is submitted to the CAS, it goes before an arbitration 
panel comprised of three arbitrators, one of whom is designated the 
President.57 These arbitrators have full power to review the facts and law of the 
case—the equivalent of the de novo standard of review in U.S. law.58 
Generally, the sequence of events in the CAS includes the petitioner filing an 
appeal, the respondent submitting a reply, and then both parties presenting 
evidence, witnesses, and oral arguments at a hearing before the panel.59 Once 
the parties have introduced all their evidence,60 the arbitration panel will 
deliberate and issue a written decision, which will be publicly disseminated 
unless the parties agree otherwise.61 When issuing its decision, the panel 
renders its award by a majority opinion; when the arbitrators do not reach a 
majority, the panel’s President issues the award alone.62 
 
divisions: (1) Ordinary Arbitration Division and (2) Appeals Arbitration Division. CAS CODE, supra note 53, 
statute S20(b). The Ordinary Arbitration Division has original jurisdiction over any dispute arising on the 
occasion of or in connection with the Olympic Games. Olympic Charter, supra note 21, at r. 74. The Appeals 
Arbitration Division resolves disputes over the finding of a federation, associations, or other sports-related 
body. Id. The CAS was created by the IOC in 1983. COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, DIGEST OF CAS 
AWARDS II 1998–2000, at xxiv (Matthieu Reeb ed., 2002) [hereinafter DIGEST II]. For a discussion of the IOC 
statutes that led to the CAS’s creation, see id.  
 55 NAFZIGER, supra note 22, at 41–43. The Olympic Charter provides, “[a]ny dispute arising on the 
occasion of, or in connection with, the Olympic Games” must be submitted exclusively to the CAS. Olympic 
Charter, supra note 21, at r. 61.2. 
 56 CAS CODE, supra note 53, r. R57. Under the 2009 WADC, all IFs must use the CAS as the sole 
mechanism for resolving doping-related disputes. See 2009 WADC, supra note 7, DC13.5, at 83. 
 57 The CAS maintains a list of at least 150 arbitrators from thirty-seven countries, who specialize in 
sports-related disputes. CAS CODE, supra note 53, statutes S12, S13. Arbitrators are appointed for four-year 
terms that may be renewed. Id. statute S13. Upon becoming a CAS arbitrator, one must sign a declaration of 
independence as a legal statement of his or her impartiality. Id. statute S18. For more information on the 
CAS’s impartiality as a whole, see History of the CAS: The 1994 Reform, CT. ARB. SPORT, http://www.tas-
cas.org/en/infogenerales.asp/4-3-236-1011-4-1-1/5-0-1011-3-0-0 (last visited Feb. 8, 2012). 
 58 CAS CODE, supra note 53, r. R57; see BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1645 (9th ed. 2009). 
 59 See generally id. rs. R51, R55. 
 60 Parties choose the applicable law. Id. r. R58. However, a CAS panel, with proper justification, may use 
general rules of law as necessary and appropriate. Id. 
 61 Id. r. R59. 
 62 Id. 
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Like many international courts of arbitration, CAS panels are not bound by 
the common law principle of stare decisis.63 Still, precedent often affects a 
panel’s final decision in one of two ways. First, scholars have noted that panels 
often follow precedent “in the interests of comity and legal certainty.”64 For 
instance, in the 1990s, CAS panels consistently applied strict liability to all 
anti-doping cases in order to build a body of anti-doping jurisprudence that 
was then codified in the 2003 WADC.65 Second, before a decision is final, the 
panel must present its award to the CAS Secretary General, who reviews the 
decision and can raise “fundamental issues of principle.”66 According to a 
former Secretary General, this review is designed to point out discrepancies 
between the current award and existing CAS precedent.67 Despite this power of 
review, the CAS Procedural Rules do not grant the Secretary General the 
authority to change the award to comport with precedent.68 Therefore, the 
panel retains the ultimate decision-making authority in the matter and can 
depart from precedent.69 
In summary, although it is independent from the IOC and WADA, the CAS 
plays an integral role in the fight against doping in sport. Its panels not only 
interpret the WADC and sanction athletes, but in the past, its jurisprudence has 
also inspired many provisions of the WADC itself. 
II. THE 2003 WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE 
As described in Part I, the world has developed a complex system of 
administrative, regulatory, and judicial bodies to combat doping in sport. At 
the center of all of these authorities is the WADC. Adopted at the Second 
World Conference on Doping in Sport on March 3, 2003, the WADC unified 
many disjointed and uncoordinated anti-doping efforts by standardizing 
 
 63 In this way, the CAS reflects the International Court of Justice Statute’s Article 59, which provides 
that “[t]he decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that 
particular case.” Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 59 (June 26, 1945) 59 Stat. 1031. 
 64 E.g., Ian Blackshaw, The Court of Arbitration for Sport: An International Forum for Settling Disputes 
Effectively ‘Within the Family of Sport’, 2 ENT. LAW 61, 62 (2003); see also Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, 
Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity, or Excuse?, 23 ARB. INT’L 357, 374 (2007). 
 65 See infra Part II.C. 
 66 CAS CODE, supra note 53, r. R59. 
 67 Michael Straubel, Enhancing the Performance of the Doping Court: How the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport Can Do Its Job Better, 26 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1203, 1257 (2005). 
 68 CAS CODE, supra note 53, rs. R46, R59. 
 69 For a discussion on the importance of following precedent in the CAS, see infra Part IV.D. 
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international regulation of doping in sport.70 Indeed, the WADC established 
the framework for harmonized anti-doping policies, rules, and regulations 
within the various athletic organizations that oversee international 
competition.71 Drafted as a “living document”72 and most recently amended in 
2009,73 the WADC’s adoption was a watershed moment in the coordinated 
international effort to eradicate doping from sport. 
When it came into force on January 4, 2004,74 the WADC occupied a 
unique place in the law. Instead of merely replacing an anti-doping 
organization’s policies against doping, the WADC established both guiding 
principles and mandatory anti-doping rules.75 Generally, the guiding principles 
are non-binding procedural guidelines for implementing doping control 
processes within a country.76 In contrast, the mandatory rules of the WADC 
include many of the WADC’s substantive provisions: “Article 1 (Definition of 
Doping), Article 2 (Anti-Doping Rule Violations), Article 3 (Proof of Doping), 
Article 9 (Automatic Disqualification of Individual Results), and Article 10 
(Sanctions).”77 Together, these articles harmonize the management of doping 
throughout the world.78 That is, the articles set forth uniform standards to quell 
confusion over questions such as what offenses constitute doping.79 
The four key areas of doping jurisprudence that the WADC harmonized 
include (A) due process, (B) the burden and standard of proof, (C) strict 
 
 70 World Conference on Doping in Sport, Copenhagen, Den., Mar. 2003, Copenhagen Declaration on 
Anti-Doping in Sport (Mar. 3, 2003), available at http://www.wada-ama.org/Documents/World_Anti-Doping_ 
Program/Governments/WADA_Copenhagen_Declaration_EN.pdf; see also Meredith Lambert, Comment, The 
Competing Justices of Clean Sport, 23 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 409, 414–15 (2009). 193 governments have 
signed the Copenhagen Declaration. Copenhagen Declaration: List of Signatories, WORLD ANTI-DOPING 
AGENCY, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/World-Anti-Doping-Program/Governments/Copenhagen-Declaration-
on-Anti-Doping-in-Sport/List-of-signatories (last updated Oct. 2009). 
 71 NAFZIGER, supra note 22, at 162; World Anti-Doping Code, supra note 47. 
 72 “Living document” means that the WADC would undergo periodic revisions. Indeed, Article 23.6 of 
the 2003 WADC stipulated that WADA would oversee the evolution and improvement of the WADC by 
proposing amendments to the WADC as necessary. WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, WORLD ANTI-DOPING 
CODE art. 23.6, at 66–67 (2003), [hereinafter 2003 WADC], available at www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/ 
document/code_v3.pdf. 
 73 For a description of the 2009 WADC, see infra Part III. 
 74 World Anti-Doping Code, supra note 47. 
 75 2003 WADC, supra note 72, intro, at 6–7. 
 76 See id. 
 77 Id.; see supra Part I. 
 78 World Anti-Doping Code, supra note 47. 
 79 2003 WADC, supra note 72, intro, at 6 (“[I]t is critical . . . that all Signatories base their decisions on 
the same list of anti-doping rule violations, the same burdens of proof and impose the same Consequences for 
the same anti-doping rule violations.”). 
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liability, and (D) sanctions. Subpart E explores these concepts within the 
context of two anti-doping cases involving Canadian skeleton racer Serge 
Despres and world record-holding American swimmer Jessica Hardy. 
A. Due Process 
Doping jurisprudence is grounded in contract law.80 When an athlete 
participates in an athletic competition as a representative of an NGB or NOC, 
she places herself in a de facto legal situation.81 She agrees, implicitly or 
otherwise, to abide by the WADC’s standards.82 Accordingly, if an athlete has 
committed a doping violation, she has consented to incur all sanctions issued 
against her by the governing body of her sport.83 The private contractual nature 
of the distribution of rights under the WADC can have serious consequences. 
For instance, American athletes who have suffered sanctions under the WADC 
have no legal right to seek redress in the domestic court system because the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause does not extend to private 
contracts.84 
Although American athletes may not seek redress in domestic courts, the 
WADC still provides for an athlete’s due process rights in a way that is 
consistent with the Constitution.85 Article 8 guarantees an accused athlete the 
right to a timely, fair hearing before an impartial adjudicatory body.86 Further, 
Article 8 expressly allows an accused athlete the right to respond and present 
evidence to challenge her alleged doping violation.87 After this hearing and 
upon issuance of that body’s decision, an athlete who competes at the 
 
 80 See CLAUDE ROUILLER, AVIS DE DROIT [Legal Opinion] 20 (2005), translation available at 
www.wada-ama.org/Documents/World_Anti-Doping_Program/WADP-Legal_Library/Advisory_and_Legal_ 
Opinions/Article_10_2_WADC_Swiss_Law.pdf; see also Connolly, supra note 34, at 174 (“Athletes . . . must 
almost always sign a document which states that the athlete agrees to be bound by the rules of the sporting 
body.”). 
 81 ROUILLER, supra note 80, at 20. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Lambert, supra note 70, at 419. 
 84 Id. (citing Robyn R. Goldstein, Note, An American in Paris: The Legal Framework of International 
Sport and the Implications of the World Anti-Doping Code on Accused Athletes, 7 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 
149, 170 (2007)). 
 85 Andrew Goldstone, Note, Obstruction of Justice: The Arbitration Process for Anti-Doping Violations 
During the Olympic Games, 7 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 361, 370 (2006). 
 86 2003 WADC, supra note 72, art. 8, at 24. Notably, Article 8 is only a “guideline principle,” not a 
mandatory rule under the Code. Id. 
 87 Id. 
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international level may appeal the decision to the CAS under Article 13.88 
Taking Articles 8 and 13 together, an accused athlete has the right to challenge 
findings of doping violations in a manner that is consistent with due process 
principles of the U.S. Constitution.89 
B. The Burden and Standard of Proof 
Article 3 places the burden of proof on the anti-doping organization that is 
prosecuting an athlete for a doping offense.90 In the past, prosecuting bodies 
have satisfied the burden of proof by using both direct and circumstantial 
evidence, but in most cases, they satisfy their burden through direct evidence.91 
In doping disputes, direct evidence is a positive drug test where an accredited 
testing agency has determined the presence of a banned substance within an 
athlete’s biological sample.92 More controversially, the CAS has upheld on 
appeal that a prosecuting body may meet its burden of proof through 
circumstantial evidence, such as testimony from testing agents of odors of 
alcohol in a urine test or skewed results from doping labs that suggested 
tampering with a urine sample.93 Notably, USADA used circumstantial 
evidence to convict American cyclist Lance Armstrong of doping offenses in 
summer 2012.94 When using either direct or circumstantial evidence to 
 
 88 Id. art. 13.2.1, at 38. National-level athletes may appeal to an independent and impartial body as 
provided by the national anti-doping organization. Id. art. 13.2.2, at 38. 
 89 Critics have argued that the 2003 WADC did not adequately protect athletes’ due process rights. See, 
e.g., Goldstone, supra note 85, at 370; Lambert, supra note 70, at 419. Lambert notes that Article 14.2 allows 
an anti-doping organization to disclose publicly any positive test results after administrative review and before 
a fair hearing. Lambert, supra note 70, at 419. Accordingly, athletes, prior to a fair hearing, can suffer 
tremendous damage to their reputation without having an opportunity to offer evidence of no fault. Id. 
 90 2003 WADC, supra note 72, art. 3, at 12–13. 
 91 Richard McLaren, CAS Doping Jurisprudence: What Can We Learn?, 2006 INT’L SPORTS L.R. 4, 9–
10. 
 92 2003 WADC, supra note 72, art. 3, 12–13. Under Article 3.2.1, WADA-accredited laboratories are 
presumed to have conducted all tests in accordance with WADA International Standards. Id. art. 3.2, at 12–13. 
However, an athlete may offer evidence to rebut this presumption. Id. In all the cases referenced in this 
Comment, the prosecuting body met its burden of proof by direct evidence. 
 93 McLaren, supra note 91, at 10. See, e.g., B. v. Fédération Internationale de Natation, CAS 98/211, 
Arbitral Award, para. 56 (Ct. Arb. Sport 1998), in DIGEST II, supra note 54, at 234, 272 (upholding the 
suspension of gold medal-winning swimmer Michelle Smith De Bruin for tampering with her urine sample 
through circumstantial evidence). 
 94 Dan Whitcomb, U.S. Anti-Doping Agency Strips Armstrong of Titles for Cheating, REUTERS, Aug. 24, 
2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/24/us-cycling-armstrong-doping-idUSBRE87N03N 
20120824. 
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implicate an athlete for a doping offense, a prosecuting body must prove the 
doping offense to the “comfortable satisfaction” of the hearing body.95 
C. Strict Liability 
The WADC has adopted strict liability for all anti-doping infractions.96 
Pursuant to this rule, if a testing agency determines that an athlete possessed a 
banned substance, then the athlete has violated the WADC.97 An athlete’s 
intent does not factor into the imposition of the infraction; therefore, a 
violation occurs regardless of whether the athlete possessed the substance 
intentionally, unintentionally, or negligently.98 In circumstances when an 
athlete tests positive for a banned substance during an in-competition drug test, 
the violation results in an automatic disqualification of individual results.99 
Cielo suffered this consequence when he tested positive for furosemide while 
competing in May 2011.100 
WADA’s rationale behind the strict liability is simple: to preserve fair 
competition.101 By adopting a strict liability standard, the WADC codified 
years of the CAS’s anti-doping jurisprudence. In these cases, the CAS has 
offered three arguments to support strict liability. First, the CAS has argued, if 
strict liability did not exist, “the fight against doping would become practically 
impossible”102 because every prosecutorial body would have to present 
evidence of an athlete’s desire to improve her performance.103 Collecting this 
evidence would not only be practically difficult, but it would also slow down 
 
 95 2003 WADC, supra note 72, art. 3.1, at 12. “Comfortable satisfaction” is higher than civil law’s 
balance of probabilities yet lower than criminal law’s beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Critics have argued that 
athletes should get procedural protections more akin to criminal law. To substantiate this argument, these 
critics have emphasized three ways in which anti-doping jurisprudence resembles criminal law more than 
contract law: (1) terminology—a convicted athlete is guilty, not a breaching party; (2) an athlete lacks 
bargaining power over her contract; and (3) an athlete suffers immediate stigmatization by competitors and 
sponsors upon conviction. See Lambert, supra note 70, at 422; see also Straubel, supra note 67, at 1272. 
 96 2003 WADC, supra note 72, art. 2.1.1 cmt., at 8–9. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Fédération Internationale de Natation v. Cielo, CAS 2011/A/2495, Arbitral Award, para. 2.6 (Ct. Arb. 
Sport 2011), available at http://www.tas-cas.org/d2wfiles/document/5094/5048/0/CAS2024952024962024972 
0249820Award20FINAL20292007202011.pdf. 
 101 Connolly, supra note 34, at 182. 
 102 C. v. Fédération Internationale de Natation, CAS 95/141, Arbitral Award, para. 13 (Ct. Arb. Sport 
1996), in COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS I, 1986–1998, at 215, 220 (Matthieu 
Reeb ed., 1998) [hereinafter DIGEST I]. 
 103 Id. 
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the adjudication process and raise the cost of litigation.104 Second, the CAS has 
noted that life itself contains inherent unfairness.105 For example, it is “unfair” 
for an athlete to get food poisoning before a competition, yet that athlete has no 
avenue for redress from this sickness.106 Accordingly, although strict liability 
will result in an unfair result where the athlete has absorbed a banned 
substance accidentally, the rules of competition cannot be changed to undo 
every injustice that may arise during the course of competition.107 Third, the 
CAS has stressed that remedying one athlete’s unfairness can result in the 
transfer of that unfairness onto her competitors.108 By excusing one athlete’s 
violation, the CAS would impose unfairness upon her competitors, as they 
would have to compete against an athlete who has a physiological 
advantage.109 From an empirical perspective, shifting the unfairness in this 
manner would actually work an injustice against more athletes. 
As strict liability appears to be a necessity in the regulation of doping in 
sport, the WADC places the onus on the athlete to monitor what substances 
enter her body.110 Under this rule, an athlete must act as the gatekeeper of her 
body.111 Accordingly, in theory, all athletes who actively monitor what they 
ingest should avoid any sanction. As supplement use has skyrocketed over the 
past decade, however, several vigilant athletes have suffered significant 
sanctions for the presence of a banned substance that had contaminated an 
otherwise valid nutritional supplement under the WADC.112 
 
 104 See USA Shooting & Q. v. Union Internationale de Tir, CAS 94/129, Arbitral Award, para. 15 (Ct. 
Arb. Sport 1995), in DIGEST I, supra note 102, at 187, 193. 
 105 See id. para. 14, at 193 (“The vicissitudes of competition, like those of life generally, may create many 
types of unfairness whether by accident or the negligence of unaccountable persons, which the law cannot 
repair.”). 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. para. 15, at 193. 
 109 Id. 
 110 See 2003 WADC, supra note 72, art. 2.1.1 cmt., at 8–9. 
 111 See id. 
 112 See, e.g., World Anti-Doping Agency v. Hardy, CAS 2009/A/1870, Arbitral Award, para. 128 (Ct. 
Arb. Sport 2010), available at http://www.wada-ama.org/Documents/World_Anti-Doping_Program/WADP-
Legal_Library/Case_Law/WADP-Case-Law-2/CAS-2009-A-1870-Hardy.pdf (one year of ineligibility); 
Vencill v. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, CAS 2003/A/484, Arbitral Award, para. 63 (Ct. Arb. Sport 2003), 
available at http://www.usada.org/files/active/arbitration_rulings/arbitration_ruling_3_17_2004_Vencill.pdf 
(two years of ineligibility).  
RATHGEBER GALLEYSPROOFS1 5/2/2013 9:28 AM 
1126 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26 
D. Sanctions  
An athlete faced two forms of sanction under the 2003 WADC. First, if an 
athlete tested positive while competing at an athletic event, she had to forfeit 
all medals, points, and prizes.113 Second, and more importantly, she faced 
either a warning or a period of ineligibility from competition.114 This second 
kind of sanction depended on a variety of circumstances, including how many 
previous violations an athlete had and what type of substance the athlete 
possessed. 115 Under Article 10.3, the sanction for possession of a “specified 
substance,” which is “particularly susceptible” to unintentional use because of 
its prevalence in over-the-counter drugs, ranged from a warning to one year of 
ineligibility for a first offense.116 Conversely, under Article 10.2 the sanction 
for possession of a “prohibited substance,” such as human growth hormone, 
was two years of ineligibility for a first offense.117 
Under the 2003 WADC, before an adjudicatory body issued its sanction, an 
athlete had the opportunity to reduce her sentence based on “exceptional 
circumstances.”118 Article 10.5 ameliorated the harsh effect of the strict 
liability principle, offering an athlete a chance to mitigate a sanction based on 
how the “prohibited” or “specified substance” came into her possession.119 
Using this WADC provision, an athlete had to argue either “No Fault or 
Negligence” or “No Significant Fault or Negligence.”120 On one hand, a 
successful argument of No Fault or Negligence eliminated a sanction 
completely.121 To meet this high standard, an athlete had to establish that she 
did not and could not have known or suspected that she had been administered 
a “prohibited substance.”122 On the other hand, a successful showing of No 
 
 113 2003 WADC, supra note 72, art. 10.1, at 26. 
 114 Id. art. 10.2, at 26–27. 
 115 This is a list of possible sanctions under Article 10 of the 2003 WADC: (1) for a first-time possession 
of a prohibited substance, a two-year period of ineligibility; (2) for a second-time possession of a prohibited 
substance, a lifetime ban from the sport; (3) for a first-time possession of a specified substance, up to a one-
year period of ineligibility; (4) for a second-time possession of a specified substance, up to a two-year period 
of ineligibility; and (5) for a third-time possession of a specified substance, up to a lifetime ban. See id. art. 10, 
at 26–36. 
 116 Id. art. 10.3, at 27–28. 
 117 Id. art. 10.2, at 26–27. 
 118 Id. art. 10.5, at 29–32. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. arts. 10.5.1, 10.5.2, at 2931. Article 10.5.3 also allows for an athlete to reduce her sanction by 
providing assistance to the anti-doping organization regarding others who may be guilty of a doping scheme. 
Id. art. 10.5.3, at 32. 
 121 Id. art.10.5.1, at 2930. 
 122 Id. app. 1, at 76. 
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Significant Fault or Negligence reduced a sanction by a maximum of one-half 
of the period of ineligibility that would otherwise exist.123 To meet this 
standard, an athlete had to prove her negligence was not significant in relation 
to the violation under the totality of circumstances.124 
Although Article 10 provided athletes with two chances to mitigate their 
punishment, comment to Article 10.5.2 expressly limited the article’s scope, 
noting that a sanction should only be mitigated when the circumstances of the 
case are “truly exceptional.”125 In this respect, comment to Article 10.5.2 listed 
sabotage by a competitor as the only way to eliminate a sanction using No 
Fault or Negligence.126 Additionally, it provided that an anti-doping 
organization should not eliminate a sanction where a violation occurs as a 
result of: (1) a mislabeled or contaminated vitamin or nutritional supplement; 
(2) taking a banned substance prescribed by the athlete’s personal physician or 
trainer; or (3) sabotage from within an athlete’s circle of associates including a 
spouse or coach.127 Although an athlete could not eliminate her punishment in 
these instances, she could have nevertheless presented unique facts of her case 
in order to prove No Significant Fault or Negligence and have her sanction 
reduced by half.128 In practice, reducing a sanction was difficult, but, from 
2003 to 2009, when the amended WADC came into effect, a few athletes 
managed to reduce their sanctions under Article 10.5.2.129 
E. Despres & Hardy: Jurisprudence Under the 2003 WADC 
The cases of Serge Despres and Jessica Hardy illustrate the principles of 
due process, burden and standard of proof, strict liability, and sanction 
mitigation under the 2003 WADC. Both cases emphasize the CAS’s strict 
interpretation of the WADC and how difficult it is to reduce one’s sanction. 
 
 123 Id. art. 10.5.2, at 3031. 
 124 Id. app. 1, at 76. 
 125 Id. art. 10.5.2 cmt., at 3031. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 See, e.g., World Anti-Doping Agency v. Hardy, CAS 2009/A/1870, Arbitral Award, para. 128 (Ct. 
Arb. Sport 2010), available at http://www.wada-ama.org/Documents/World_Anti-Doping_Program/WADP-
Legal_Library/Case_Law/WADP-Case-Law-2/CAS-2009-A-1870-Hardy.pdf (reducing the athlete’s sentence 
from two years to one year of ineligibility). 
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In 2007, Serge Despres tested positive for nandrolone, an anabolic steroid 
that can increase muscle growth and red blood cell production.130 A Canadian 
skeleton racer, Despres had recently undergone hip surgery and, at the advice 
of a nutritionist for the national organization for bobsledding in Canada, was 
taking a nutritional supplement to facilitate his recovery.131 Before ingesting 
this supplement, he had researched its contents and determined that it 
contained no ingredients that WADA prohibited.132 Despite his efforts, 
however, nandrolone appeared in this supplement by an alleged contamination 
during the manufacturing process.133 
Upon hearing his case, a local tribunal134 determined that Despres had 
violated the WADC, but the circumstances of his positive test qualified him for 
twenty months of ineligibility rather than two years of ineligibility.135 Upon 
this ruling, WADA appealed to the CAS, arguing that Despres was not entitled 
to a reduced sanction because his case was not “truly exceptional.”136 Agreeing 
with WADA, the CAS panel issued Despres the standard two-year 
suspension.137 According to the panel, to qualify for a reduction of the 
punishment, Despres needed to have taken additional steps to ensure what he 
was ingesting was not a “prohibited substance.”138 These steps included 
contacting the manufacturer, conducting more research into the contents of the 
supplement, or following up with the nutritionist.139 Because he did not take 
these precautions, Despres suffered the full punishment. In response to the 
sanction, he lamented, “I was scared and felt like my whole world was 
crashing down on me. None of it made sense to me.”140 
 
 130 Despres v. Canadian Ctr. for Ethics and Sport, CAS 2008/A/1489, Arbitral Award, para. 2.2 (Ct. Arb. 
Sport 2008), http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/CAS_2008_A_1510_Despres.pdf. 
 131 Id. para. 5.12a. 
 132 Id. para. 5.12e. 
 133 Id. para. 5.15. According to the Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport, independent laboratory tests 
conducted on the supplement confirmed that it had been laced with steroids. Contaminated Supplement Likely 
Cause of Failed Drug Test, CANADIAN CTR. ETHICS SPORT (Feb. 19, 2008), http://www.cces.ca/en/news-35-
contaminated-supplement-likely-cause-of-failed. 
 134 In this case, the local tribunal was the Sport Dispute Resolution Centre of Canada. Despres, CAS 
2008/A/1489, para. 3.1. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. para. 5.2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 137 Id. para. 7.1. 
 138 Id. para. 7.9. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Beverley Smith, Despres Fights Back Against Doping Penalty, GLOBE & MAIL, Feb. 21, 2008, at S5, 
available at 2008 WLNR 3356530 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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One year after Despres’s failed drug test, American swimmer Jessica Hardy 
tested positive for the “prohibited substance” clenbuterol, which can increase 
aerobic capacity, just days after qualifying for the Beijing Olympics.141 Similar 
to Despres, Hardy traced her ingestion of the “prohibited substance” to a 
supplement that she had been taking prior to competition—AdvoCare 
Argenine Extreme.142 Unlike Despres, however, Hardy had taken no less than 
eight affirmative steps to ensure that the supplement was safe for 
consumption.143 These steps included researching the supplement; having 
personal conversations with AdvoCare agents; receiving assurance that 
AdvoCare had an independent company test its products for purity; only 
obtaining the supplement directly through AdvoCare; and consulting with 
various swimming personnel, including the national team nutritionist, about 
AdvoCare’s contents.144 Despite her due diligence and the fact that she had 
been taking the product for eight months without a failed drug test, Hardy 
found herself in the United States facing two years of ineligibility instead of 
competing for a gold medal in Beijing.145 
Pursuant to the USADA’s Protocol for Olympic Movement Testing, Hardy 
had her case appointed to a panel of arbitrators from the North American 
Office of the CAS, operating as the American Arbitration Association (“AAA–
CAS”).146 Although the panel found that Hardy had violated the 2003 WADC, 
it determined that Hardy’s negligence did not rise to the level of being 
significant, and therefore, her period of ineligibility could be reduced to one 
year, the maximum reduction possible under the 2003 WADC.147 
WADA appealed the AAA–CAS’s ruling to the CAS, arguing that Hardy’s 
sanction should not have been reduced because the exigencies of her case were 
 
 141 World Anti-Doping Agency v. Hardy, CAS 2009/A/1870, Arbitral Award, paras. 5–6 (Ct. Arb. Sport 
2010), available at http://www.wada-ama.org/Documents/World_Anti-Doping_Program/WADP-Legal_ 
Library/Case_Law/WADP-Case-Law-2/CAS-2009-A-1870-Hardy.pdf. 
 142 Id. para. 12. 
 143 Id. para. 13. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. paras. 8–9. The AAA-CAS is an offspring of the CAS that was created in 1996 to resolve the 
inconsistent adjudication of North American NGBs. Athletes whose cases are heard before the AAACAS still 
have the right to appeal to the CAS. For a detailed description of the AAACAS’s history, procedures, 
administration, see Straubel, supra note 67, at 1219–25. 
 147 Hardy, CAS 2009/A/1870, para. 14. 
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not “truly exceptional.”148 Rejecting this argument, the CAS panel held that the 
circumstances of Hardy’s positive test met the “truly exceptional” standard.149 
In the panel’s opinion, Hardy had researched and investigated AdvoCare’s 
products in a manner reasonably expected from an informed athlete wishing to 
avoid risks connected with supplements.150 Indeed, citing Despres, the panel 
ruled that Hardy made a good faith effort “to leave no reasonable stone 
unturned.”151 Although the panel avoided a direct comparison of Despres’ and 
Hardy’s cases, the citation suggests that the panel thought Hardy’s due 
diligence warranted a lesser period of ineligibility than Despres received.152 
In a subsequent discussion of the appropriate length of Hardy’s suspension, 
the panel rendered two important thoughts in dicta.153 First, the panel noted 
that the “level of diligence due by an athlete” had risen over the years.154 The 
panel, however, offered no citation to substantiate this claim, merely stating 
that future panels must evaluate the relation of fault with the reduction of the 
sanction.155 Second, the panel proclaimed, “[I]t follows . . . that CAS 
precedents . . . have to be reviewed carefully to determine whether or not the 
standard of care established at that time is still valid today.”156 Despite this 
statement, the CAS did not discuss precedent when determining the length of 
Hardy’s sanction.157 Instead, the CAS merely denounced WADA’s appeal for 
two years of ineligibility as “too harsh” and without “sufficient basis in the 
rules.”158 
The panel’s endorsement of using precedent without engaging in a 
discussion of any precedent is frustrating. As a non-common law tribunal that 
is not bound by stare decisis, the panel did not have to evaluate precedent.159 
Still, the panel invoked Despres, suggesting an implicit comparison of the facts 
 
 148 Id. para. 64. “Truly exceptional” was defined as “when an athlete can show that the degree of fault or 
negligence in the totality of the circumstances was such that it was not significant in relation to the doping 
offence.” Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 149 Id. para. 120. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. para. 127. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
 157 See id. paras. 123–29. The cases the CAS cites offer support for a different proposition—that a review 
of a sanction is only permitted when grossly disproportionate to the offense. Id. para. 128. 
 158 Id. 
 159 See id. paras. 123–29. 
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between Despres and Hardy, but then it refused to compare the specific 
exigencies of Hardy’s case with Despres or any other cases to decide the 
appropriate length of her sanction.160 Without a measured discussion of why 
Hardy deserved a different period of ineligibility than another athlete, the 
opinion avoided a justification for its holding. Accordingly, the decision seems 
incomplete, as if the panel missed an opportunity to refine the contours of the 
law and elucidate how athletes could take necessary steps to ensure due 
diligence before ingesting supplements. 
Perhaps one of the reasons why the panel did not elaborate on the 
appropriate length of Hardy’s sanction compared to other athletes was because 
the 2003 WADC was already obsolete. Indeed, by the time Hardy’s case was 
heard, delegates at the Third World Conference on Doping in Sport had 
already endorsed several amendments to the 2003 WADC.161 These 
amendments, which came into effect on January 1, 2009, and their subsequent 
effect on doping jurisprudence, are the subject of Part III. 
III.  JURISPRUDENCE UNDER THE 2009 WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE 
The WADC’s drafters never intended for the 2003 WADC to be a 
conclusive set of all anti-doping rules and principles.162 In 2006, WADA 
initiated a WADC revision process, calling for input from “anyone.”163 After 
nearly two years of discussion and seventy presentations to stakeholder groups, 
WADA’s Executive Committee and Foundation Board unanimously approved 
a revised WADC (“2009 WADC”).164 Two general themes emerged from the 
revisions—firmness and fairness.165 Although these themes permeate the entire 
2009 WADC, this Part focuses on these themes within the provisions on 
sanctions, Article (“DC”) 10.166 
 
 160 Id. 
 161 Ensuring a Level Playing Field, PLAY TRUE, Issue 3, 2008, at 4, available at http://www.wada-
ama.org/Documents/Resources/Publications/PlayTrue_Magazine/PlayTrue_2008_3_Levelling_the_Playing_Fi
eld_EN.pdf (an official publication of the World Anti-Doping Agency). 
 162 Q&A: 2009 Code, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY (Jan. 1, 2009), www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/ 
document/qa_2009_code_en.pdf. Article 23.6 expressly provided for amendments after a sufficient 
consultative process that involved review and feedback from athletes, signatories, and governments. 2009 
WADC, supra note 7, DC23.6, at 121. 
 163 Q&A: 2009 Code, supra note 162. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. 
 166 When this Comment references articles in the 2009 WADC, “DC” precedes the article number. In 
contrast, when this Comment reference articles in the 2003 WADC, “Article” precedes the article number. For 
a textual comparison of the 2003 WADC and 2009 WADC, see infra Appendix, Figure 1. 
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A. DC10: Firmness and Fairness in the 2009 WADC 
DC10 resembles Article 10 in structure and content. However, DC10 
changes the definition of two key terms, revises the provision concerning 
“specified substances,” and includes a new provision regarding multiple 
offenses. Together, these changes not only grant adjudicatory bodies greater 
discretion to fashion sanctions for first time offenders but also create stricter 
guidelines for administering sanctions in aggravated circumstances. 
Comparable to the 2003 WADC, the 2009 WADC instructs an adjudicatory 
authority to sanction an athlete based on the type of substance the athlete 
possessed, the circumstances around the positive drug test, and the number of 
times an athlete has violated the WADC.167 For a first time offense, an athlete 
likely still faces two years of ineligibility for a prohibited substance and either 
a reprimand or a period of ineligibility for a specified substance.168 
The most notable similarity between DC10 and Article 10 is that DC10.5.1 
and DC10.5.2 contain nearly identical language to Article 10.5.1 and 10.5.2.169 
Therefore, under the 2009 WADC, athletes can use DC10.5.1 and DC10.5.2 to 
argue that the exceptional circumstances of their case allow them to escape or 
mitigate a sanction because they had no fault, or no significant fault.170 Like 
the 2003 WADC, however, athletes who test positive for a banned substance 
that they ingested via a supplement cannot argue No Fault or Negligence under 
DC10.5.1 to escape sanction entirely.171 
Despite some similar structure and language, the 2009 WADC departs from 
the 2003 WADC in three noteworthy ways. First, the 2009 revisions redefine 
“prohibited” and “specified” substances, vastly expanding the latter category. 
Under the 2003 WADC, WADA identified “specified substances” as a finite 
subset of its Prohibited List, and, notably, the list of “specified substances” 
contained many fewer substances than the list of “prohibited substances.”172 In 
 
 167 2009 WADC, supra note 7, DC10.1, at 51. 
 168 Id. arts. 10.4, 10.5, at 54–62. 
 169 Id. arts. 10.5.1, 10.5.2, at 5657; 2003 WADC, supra note 72, arts. 10.5.1, 10.5.2, at 20–31. 
 170 2009 WADC, DC10.5, at 5662. 
 171 Id. DC10.5.1 cmt., at 56. 
 172 See, e.g., The 2012 Prohibited List, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY (Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.wada-
ama.org/Documents/World_Anti-Doping_Program/WADP-Prohibited-list/2012/WADA_Prohibited_List_ 
2012_EN.pdf [hereinafter WADA Prohibited List]. As alluded to earlier, testing positive for a “specified 
substance” under certain circumstances could result in a less severe sanction—at a minimum a warning, at a 
maximum two years of ineligibility—for the first offense. 2009 WADC, supra note 7, art. 4.2.2, at 31, art. 
10.4, at 5455. 
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contrast, the 2009 WADC stipulates that all “prohibited substances,” except 
anabolic agents and peptide hormones on the Prohibited List, are “specified 
substances” for the purpose of sanctions.173 The 2009 WADC’s semantic 
change greatly expands the list of “specified substances.” In turn, a larger list 
of “specified substances” increases the likelihood that an athlete will be able to 
reduce her sanction because an athlete may use DC10.4 to mitigate her 
sanction.174 
The revised DC10.4 is the second important change in the 2009 WADC. 
DC10.4 (“Elimination or Reduction of the Period of Ineligibility for Specified 
Substances under Specific Circumstances”) replaces the 2003 WADC’s Article 
10.3 (“Specified Substances”).175 Under DC10.4, a first-time offender faces at 
a minimum a warning and at a maximum two years of ineligibility for a 
positive drug test.176 Although DC10.4 increases the maximum sanction for a 
first-time offender (formerly one year under Article 10.3), it includes new 
language that explains how an athlete can mitigate her sanction. This new text 
provides that, if an athlete can establish how the substance entered her body 
and produce corroborating evidence that it was not intended to improve 
performance or mask the use of performance enhancing drugs, then the 
athlete’s “degree of fault” is “the criterion” for determining the sanction’s 
appropriate length.177 
The addition of DC10.4 reflected a concern for athletes who had tested 
positive for a banned substance without intent to gain an unfair competitive 
advantage.178 By adding the language in DC10.4 and changing the definition of 
“specified substances” to include all banned substances aside from those on the 
Prohibited List, WADA granted adjudicatory bodies greater discretion in 
reducing sanctions based on extenuating circumstances of a positive drug test. 
Providing adjudicating authorities with this discretion, however, has not solved 
all of the shortcomings of the WADC because there is still an inherent flaw in 
the dichotomy between DC10.4 and DC10.5, which is discussed in Part IV.179 
The third major revision in the 2009 WADC appears in DC10.7. Here, the 
drafters sought to increase sanctions in cases involving multiple anti-doping 
 
 173 2009 WADC, supra note 7, DC4.2.2, at 31. 
 174 See id. DC10.4, at 54–55. 
 175 Id.; 2003 WADC, supra note 72, art. 10.3, at 27–28. 
 176 2009 WADC, supra note 7, DC10.4, at 54–55. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Ensuring a Level Playing Field, supra note 161, at 4–6. 
 179 See infra Part IV.C. 
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violations.180 Under DC10.7, which has no counterpart in the 2003 WADC, if 
an athlete violates the WADC more than one time, she faces a period of 
ineligibility set forth in a table in DC10.7 (one year to a lifetime ban depending 
on the number and type of violations).181 Accordingly, when DC10.7 controls, 
an athlete receives a more severe sanction, and the court has less discretion 
over which sanction to apply based on the athlete’s degree of fault. Although 
the addition of DC10.7 provides clearer instructions for adjudicatory bodies 
issuing a sanction for an athlete’s second offense, it can lead to disparate 
sanctions under certain circumstances, such as in Cielo.182 
In total, the 2009 WADC revisions regarding sanctions promoted WADA’s 
two broad goals: firmness and fairness.183 The severe sanctions under DC10.7 
increased the penalties for repeat offenders. In contrast, the new definition of 
“specified substances” and the new language in DC10.4 not only increased the 
likelihood that an athlete who mistakenly ingested a banned substance could 
mitigate her sanction, but also granted more discretion to adjudicatory bodies 
to consider the circumstances of a positive test before issuing a sanction for a 
first-time offender. 
B. Melnychenko & Cielo: CAS Interpretation of DC10 
The cases of Ukrainian gymnast Anastasia Melnychenko and Brazilian 
swimmer César Cielo illustrate how the CAS determines a sanction under the 
2009 WADC. Both Melnychenko and Cielo tested positive for the substance 
furosemide,184 but despite possessing the same substance, the athletes received 
different sanctions—a four-month ban for Melnychenko and a warning for 
Cielo.185 This Subpart will analyze the athletes’ sanctions, inspecting each 
case’s attendant circumstances to explain why the CAS panels reached such 
divergent results. 
 
 180 Ensuring a Level Playing Field, supra note 161, at 5. Other examples of aggravating circumstances 
include being part of a large doping scheme, or engaging in deceptive or obstructive conduct to avoid detection 
of a banned substance. 2009 WADC, supra note 7, DC10.6 cmt., at 65. 
 181 2009 WADC, supra note 7, art. 10.7. 
 182 See supra Introduction. 
 183 Ensuring a Level Playing Field, supra note 161, at 3. 
 184 World Anti-Doping Agency v. Melnychenko, CAS 2011/A/2403, Arbitral Award para. 2.3 (Ct. Arb. 
Sport 2011), available at http://www.tas-cas.org/d2wfiles/document/5179/5048/0/Award20240320_internet_. 
pdf; Fédération Internationale de Natation v. Cielo, CAS 2011/A/2495, Arbitral Award, para. 2.3 (Ct. Arb. 
Sport 2011), available at http://www.tas-cas.org/d2wfiles/document/5094/5048/0/CAS2024952024962024972 
0249820Award20FINAL20292007202011.pdf. 
 185 Melnychenko, CAS 2011/A/2403, para. 7.9; Cielo, CAS 2011/A/2495, para. 8.32. 
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1. WADA v. Melnychenko 
At the European Team Championships for Gymnastics in October 2010, 
Ukraine’s Anastasia Melnychenko tested positive for furosemide.186 Just 
fifteen years old at the time of the test, Melnychenko had her father prepare a 
memorandum and commission a medical report from her physician to explain 
how the “specified substance” entered her body.187 According to these 
documents, Melnychenko took the medication “Lasix” for one and a half days 
to relieve pain and a high temperature caused by a boil on her nose.188 Taking 
the circumstances of her use into account under DC10.4, the International 
Federation of Gymnastics (“FIG”) suspended Melnychenko for two 
months⎯substantially less than the two years Melnychenko could have 
received.189 
Dissatisfied with the ruling, WADA appealed to the CAS in hopes of 
imposing two years of ineligibility.190 Respondents argued that FIG’s ruling 
should be upheld.191 Financially unable to hire an attorney or travel to the CAS 
to represent her interests, Melnychenko’s father sent a letter to the CAS on 
behalf of his daughter.192 His letter had two objectives. First, he reiterated his 
daughter’s innocence by stating he made the decision to give her Lasix when 
she was in a semi-unconscious state because her health was more important 
than “imaginary values” created by the WADC.193 Second, he attacked WADA 
for its failure to take into account individual characteristics of an investigated 
person, such as his daughter’s age, health, and relative inexperience.194 
Reviewing the case, the CAS panel balanced the need to sanction a doping 
offense against the exceptional circumstances of Melnychenko’s case.195 The 
panel found factors in favor of both sides. In favor of increasing the sanction, 
the panel emphasized the WADC’s foundation in strict liability and that it is 
the athlete’s burden to remain vigilant regarding everything that enters her 
body.196 In favor of a reduced sanction, however, the panel noted three 
 
 186 Melnychenko, CAS 2011/A/2403, para. 2.3. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. para. 2.5. 
 189 Id. para. 2.6.; see 2009 WADC, supra note 7, DC10.4–.5, at 54–62. 
 190 Melnychenko, CAS 2011/A/2403, paras. 3.1−.2. 
 191 Id. para. 3.5. 
 192 Id. para. 3.4. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. paras. 3.4, 7.5, 7.8. 
 196 See id. para. 7.6. 
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circumstances: (1) Melnychenko’s age; (2) the fact that a medical decision had 
to be made quickly by her father; and (3) the fact that Melnychenko had asked 
her doctor whether Lasix contained any “prohibited substances” before taking 
it.197 Weighing the parties’ interests against each other, the panel increased 
Melnychenko’s two-month suspension to four months.198 
Although Melnychenko’s case revealed which factors a CAS panel 
considers for determining an appropriate sanction, the panel only offered a 
cursory overview of how to balance these factors against each other.199 Indeed, 
the opinion avoided an extensive analysis of how a particular factor translates 
into a finite number of months of ineligibility.200 The panel cited two cases 
(Squizzato, CAS 2005/A/830 and Foschi, CAS 1996/A/156) in which athletes 
received reduced sanctions on account of their age and inexperience, 
suggesting that Melnychenko’s youth played a big factor in its decision to 
reduce her sanction by sixteen months.201 Instead of discussing this factor in 
relation to the other factors, however, the panel simply concluded that “a 
suspension of four months . . . would better reflect the seriousness of the 
offense, the fundamental responsibility of the athlete and her young age and 
lack of experience.”202 On its face, the suspension comports with the text of 
WADC and seems reasonable under the circumstances. But by refusing to 
elaborate on its rationale for the sanction, the panel’s decision of four months 
seems arbitrary—a haphazard number of months that is more than two and less 
than twenty-four. The CAS panel should have entered into a more substantial 
comparative analysis to rationalize its decision. 
 
 197 Id. para. 7.5. 
 198 Id. para. 7.9. 
 199 See id. paras. 7.5−7.9. 
 200 See id. 
 201 Id. para. 7.8 (citing S v. FINA, CAS 2005/A/830, Arbitral Award (Ct. Arb. Sport 2005);. Foschi v. 
Fédération Internationale de Natation Amateure, CAS 1996/A/156, Arbitral Award (Ct. Arb. Sport 1996)). 
Perhaps not coincidentally, Foschi (of the case Foschi, CAS 1996/A/156) went on to attend Duke University 
School of Law and write a Note about the doping system. See Jessica K. Foschi, Note, A Constant Battle: The 
Evolving Challenges in the International Fight Against Doping in Sport, 16 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 457 
(2006). 
 202 Melnychenko, CAS 2011/A/2403, para. 7.9. 
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2. FINA v. Cielo 
a. Background and Procedural Posture 
César Cielo and three of his teammates (Nicholas Dias dos Santos, 
Henrique Barbosa, and Vinicius Waked) tested positive for furosemide at the 
Maria Lenk swimming competition in May 2011.203 On July 1, 2011, the 
athletes attended a sanction hearing before the CBDA.204 At the hearing, each 
athlete argued that a contaminated caffeine tablet had caused their anti-doping 
violation, and therefore, they should receive a reduced sanction under DC10.205 
After consideration, the CBDA determined that all the athletes, save Waked, 
should have their results at Maria Lenk disqualified and, pursuant to DC10.4, 
be issued a warning because there was No Fault or Negligence on their part.206 
Because Waked had already committed a doping violation in 2010, he was 
subject to a sanction under DC10.7, but, like the others, he suffered no period 
of ineligibility because the CBDA found No Fault or Negligence on his part.207 
In reaching these holdings, the CBDA merged discrete provisions of the 2009 
WADC, incorporating the no significant fault language of DC10.5 into its 
holding under DC10.4.208 Accordingly, FINA sought immediate appeal. 
FINA challenged the CBDA’s ruling on three fronts.209 First, although 
FINA acknowledged that the athletes had proven both how furosemide entered 
their bodies and that it was not intended to improve performance, FINA argued 
that the case did not qualify as one of No Fault or Negligence.210 Second, 
because the athletes did not have No Fault or Negligence, FINA claimed that 
DC10.4 applied and, accordingly, Cielo, dos Santos, and Barbosa should be 
suspended for three months based on their “degree of fault.”211 Third, FINA 
 
 203 Fédération Internationale de Natation v. Cielo, CAS 2011/A/2495, Arbitral Award, paras. 2.1–.2 (Ct. 
Arb. Sport 2011), available at  http://www.tas-cas.org/d2wfiles/document/5094/5048/0/CAS20249520249620 
249720249820Award20FINAL20292007202011.pdf. 
 204 Id. para. 2.3. 
 205 Id. para. 3.4(y). 
 206 Id. para. 2.6. 
 207 Id. paras. 2.7−2.8. 
 208 See id. paras. 2.6, 2.8. The CBDA’s interpretation in Cielo’s case is an example of an improper 
interpretation of the WADC. In that case, the CBDA decided that, in accordance with DC10.4, the appropriate 
sanction for the athletes was a warning because there was No Fault or Negligence. Id. para. 2.6. As the CAS 
Panel pointed out, however, the ruling was “inconsistent and in error.” Id. para. 2.9. DC10.4 does not permit a 
finding of No Fault or Negligence; only DC10.5.1 permits that finding. See id. 
 209 Id. para. 7.6. 
 210 Id. 
 211 Id. 
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argued Waked should be ineligible for one year due to his previous anti-doping 
rule violation.212 
In rebuttal, the athletes offered three arguments. First, they contended that 
caffeine was a “medication,” not a “supplement,” and therefore, their case 
should be adjudicated under DC10.5.1.213 Second, in the alternative that the 
panel found caffeine to be a supplement, the athletes, save Waked, argued that 
their sanction under DC10.4 should be a warning due to the circumstances of 
their positive drug test.214 Third, the athletes argued that, if caffeine was found 
to be a supplement, Waked should receive a sanction of three to four months 
under DC10.7.215 
b. CAS Decision 
What sanction the athletes deserved hinged on two issues: (1) whether 
caffeine was a “supplement” or “medication;” and (2) the athletes’ “degree of 
fault.” 
First, to solve the preliminary question of what subsection of DC10 
applied, the panel had to classify the caffeine pill as a “medication” or 
“supplement.”216 Once that was determined, the panel could decide the 
appropriate sanctions for the athletes.217 On one hand, if the panel ruled 
caffeine was a “medication,” DC10.5.1 could apply.218 Under DC10.5.1, if an 
athlete could both prove that she bore No Fault or Negligence and establish 
how the “prohibited substance” entered her system, then the anti-doping rule 
violation would not be considered a violation for the purpose of determining 
the period of ineligibility.219 As a result, the panel could impose “no sanction, 
not even a warning.”220 On the other hand, if the panel found that caffeine was 
a supplement, DC10.5.1 could not apply because the comment to DC10.5.1 
expressly prohibits a sanction’s elimination where an athlete tests positive 
from a “contaminated vitamin or nutritional supplement.”221 Thus, if caffeine 
 
 212 Id. 
 213 Id. para. 7.8. 
 214 Id. 
 215 Id. 
 216 See id. 
 217 See id. 
 218 Id. 
 219 2009 WADC, supra note 7, DC10.5.1. 
 220 Cielo, CAS 2011/A/2495, para. 2.9(a). 
 221 2009 WADC, supra note 7, DC10.5.1–.2 cmt., at 56–57. 
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was a supplement, the athletes could not eliminate their sanction.222 Instead, 
the athletes would be subject to DC10.4, where the panel would assess their 
“degree of fault” in determining what sanction should apply—at a minimum, a 
reprimand, and at a maximum, two years of ineligibility.223 
In answering this medication/supplement question, the panel made a three-
part investigation, ultimately concluding caffeine was a supplement.224 First, 
the panel inspected the FINA Rules and WADC for a definition of 
“medication” or “supplement.”225 Both were silent on the issue, thus 
highlighting the need to define these terms in future versions of the WADC.226 
Second, the panel considered evidence proffered by Cielo’s doctor, Dr. 
Magliocca, who claimed he had prescribed the caffeine in its pure form as a 
medication.227 The panel, however, rejected Dr. Magliocca’s view because it 
was neither supported by medical literature nor corroborated by an 
independent medical practitioner.228 Third, the panel performed its own 
inquiry.229 Considering real world uses of caffeine, the panel concluded 
caffeine was a supplement for five reasons: (1) it is readily available; (2) it is 
available without prescription; (3) it can be found in everyday products, such 
as coffee and energy drinks; (4) an ordinary person would not consider 
caffeine a “medication;” and (5) it is not curative or healing.230 In the face of 
the silent WADC, this five-factor test provided a thoughtful and measured 
analysis that should inform future panels. 
Having concluded that caffeine was a “supplement,” the panel had thereby 
determined that the athletes were not entitled to an elimination of their 
sanction, and therefore, it would need to assess the athletes’ “degree of fault” 
under DC10.4.231 To make this determination, the panel reviewed the facts of 
the case and concluded the athletes’ fault was “at the very lowest end of the 
spectrum of fault.”232 Substantiating this holding, the panel cited the 
 
 222 See id. DC10.5.1–.2 cmt., at 56–57. 
 223 Id. DC10.4, at 55. 
 224 Cielo, CAS 2011/A/2495, para. 8.19. 
 225 Id. para. 8.13. 
 226 Id.; see infra Part IV.B. 
 227 Cielo, CAS 2011/A/2495, paras. 8.13−.14. 
 228 Id. para. 8.14−.15. 
 229 Id. para. 8.15. 
 230 Id. paras. 8.15−.18. Although the athletes had a prescription for caffeine in its pure form, the panel 
refused to accept that a substance automatically qualifies as a “medication” if a prescription is necessary to 
obtain it. Id. para. 8.17. 
 231 See 2009 WADC, supra note 7, arts. 10.4–10.5, 54–62. 
 232 Cielo, CAS 2011/A/2495, para. 8.24. 
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circumstances of the positive drug test, the evidence that the athletes had 
offered to prove their diligence in ensuring that the product they were ingesting 
was safe for consumption, and the sworn testimony from the pharmacy where 
the allegedly tainted caffeine originated.233 
Considering the rationale for this holding in turn, the panel first noted that 
the circumstances of the positive drug test weighed in favor of the athletes.234 
According to testimony, Cielo had been taking the caffeine tablets since 
January 2010 and had taken no fewer than five urine tests without testing 
positive for a “specified substance.”235 Additionally, the doping results showed 
that the urine concentrations of the failed drug test were within the normal 
range and not diluted.236 Accordingly, the furosemide in Cielo’s system could 
not have been used as an agent to mask the presence of a performance-
enhancing drug.237 
Second, the panel determined that the athletes’ fault was minimal because 
Cielo and his doctor took every reasonable precautionary measure possible 
before the athletes ingested the caffeine. These precautions included these 
facts: (1) Cielo, on behalf of his teammates, had consulted his father, a Health 
Secretary in Brazil, to determine which pharmacy complied best with health 
regulations;238 (2) Cielo’s father ensured Cielo that Anna Terra Pharmacy had 
the best reputation;239 (3) Cielo would have his prescription filled by Anna 
Terra and then, upon pick-up, deliver the pills to Dr. Magliocca;240 (4) Dr. 
Magliocca would only administer the pills when requested and when he 
thought appropriate;241 (5) Dr. Magliocca personally ensured each athlete that 
the prescription was safe every time he administered it;242 and, (6) on more 
than one occasion, Dr. Magliocca had visited Anna Terra and reviewed an 
electronic certificate of the new shipment’s purity.243 Taking these facts in the 
aggregate, the panel concluded that Cielo and Dr. Magliocca took every 
practical precaution to avoid a positive drug test.244 Playing devil’s advocate, 
 
 233 Id. para. 8.25 (referring to the factual findings set out in para. 3.4). 
 234 See id. para. 3.4. 
 235 Id. para. 3.4(l). 
 236 Id. para. 3.4(z). 
 237 Id. 
 238 See id. para. 3.4(i). 
 239 See id. para. 3.4(j). 
 240 See id. para. 3.4(r). 
 241 See id. 
 242 See id. para. 3.4(s). 
 243 See id. para. 3.4(u). 
 244 Id. para. 8.25. 
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the panel opined that the athletes could have tested each pill individually or 
refrained from using caffeine,245 but it rejected these possibilities because 
testing each pill would have been “disproportionately expensive and time 
consuming” and because caffeine was a legal substance under the WADC.246 
The final contributing factor to the panel’s conclusion of minimal fault was 
evidence provided by the Anna Terra Pharmacy.247 In a declaration, pharmacy 
representative Ana Tereza Cósimo de Souza stated that, on the day that one 
bottle of caffeine tablets was being prepared, the pharmacy was also filling 
several prescriptions that included furosemide.248 Notably, de Souza did not 
definitively state that the pills had been contaminated at the pharmacy.249 
Although the evidence was not unequivocal, the panel accepted the possibility 
that the furosemide “inadvertently contaminated” the caffeine.250 As a result, 
the panel accepted this third party human error as the source of the 
contamination.251 
As previously stated, the panel took all of these factors under consideration 
and ultimately determined that the athletes’ fault was at the “very lowest end of 
the spectrum.”252 Accordingly, as its next step, the panel had to convert this 
degree of fault into a sanction under DC10.4. The panel lamented its position 
as “somewhat of a dilemma”253 because “looking at the matters objectively and 
with common sense, it [could not] find anything but the slightest fault on the 
part of the Athletes.”254 Therefore, it determined the “only appropriate 
sanction” for the athletes, save Waked, was a warning.255 Here, the panel’s 
admission that these facts put it in a “dilemma” is particularly telling. By 
admitting its quandary, the panel seemed to acknowledge the novelty of its 
decision—never before had an athlete escaped a period of ineligibility after 
possession of a banned substance. Still, as discussed in Part IV.A, the 2009 
WADC’s text and the respondents’ evidence warranted such a holding. 
 
 245 Id. para. 8.26, 8.29. 
 246 Id. para. 8.26. 
 247 See id. para. 8.24. 
 248 Id. para. 3.4(y). 
 249 Id. 
 250 Id. 
 251 Id. 
 252 Id. para. 8.24. 
 253 Id. para. 8.31. 
 254 Id. 
 255 Id. para. 8.32. 
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Turning to Waked, the panel had to evaluate his positive drug test under 
DC10.7 because he had already committed a doping violation in 2010.256 
Although the panel found his fault to be just as negligible as the others, it had 
to apply a period of ineligibility in accordance with a table in DC10.7.257 This 
table mandated that the period of ineligibility range from one to four years; 
accordingly, the panel elected the smallest sanction, sentencing Waked to one 
year of ineligibility.258 Again, under the 2009 WADC, the panel issued a fair 
sanction against Waked because repeat offenders unquestionably faced 
sanction under DC10.7. 
IV.  CRACKS IN THE CODE: IMPROVING THE WADC AFTER CIELO 
Because of its timing and the athletes involved, the panel’s decision in 
Cielo made international headlines.259 Many derided the panel for a poor 
ruling—letting Cielo off with a mere warning or for setting a “dangerous 
precedent.”260 Part IV, however, argues that the panel made a valid ruling 
under the 2009 WADC. This Part also analyzes Cielo to reveal possible 
shortcomings of the WADC and to offer suggestions for how WADA can 
improve the WADC and the public’s understanding of the WADC. In light of 
these goals, this Part is divided into four subsections: (A) an analysis of Cielo; 
(B) the need for the WADC to define the terms “medication” and 
“supplement;” (C) the problems with DC10.4 and DC10.5; and (D) why CAS 
panels should discuss precedent in every case. 
A. Analyzing Cielo: A Fair Ruling on the Merits 
Despite the criticism it received, the panel reached a fair holding in Cielo 
for two reasons. First, the respondents offered ample evidence to demonstrate 
their minimal degree of fault under DC10.4. Second, the panel’s decision 
comported with the letter of the WADC and was buttressed by the purpose of 
the 2009 revisions. 
 
 256 Id. para. 8.34(s). 
 257 Id. paras. 8.43–.45. 
 258 Id. para. 8.46. 
 259 See, e.g., Dampf, supra note 14. 
 260 Id. 
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A review of the respondents’ evidence shows its breadth, scope, and 
detail.261 In the abstract, the evidence fell into three major groupings—
evidence of the Cielo’s due diligence, evidence of Dr. Magliocca’s due 
diligence, and evidence of the pharmacy’s potential error.262 Taking these 
groupings in turn, Cielo, on behalf of all the respondents, consulted a reputable 
public official for advice on the best pharmacy in his hometown; upon 
obtaining a prescription, he transferred possession to Dr. Magliocca; and he 
sought reassurance time and again from Dr. Magliocca that the pills were 
safe.263 Likewise, Dr. Magliocca personally visited the pharmacy on numerous 
occasions; he met with pharmacy staff; he read medical literature on pure-form 
caffeine; and he personally viewed an electronic certificate confirming that the 
caffeine was “100% pure.”264 Last, the Anna Terra Pharmacy’s representative 
declared that it filled several prescriptions involving furosemide on the same 
day it filled Cielo’s prescription for caffeine.265 Based upon all of this 
evidence, the athletes’ actual “fault” was extremely minimal. 
But the fact that the evidence established that the athletes had only the 
slightest fault is not the main reason why this decision was a fair one; instead, 
what makes this decision fair is how the panel interpreted its finding of 
minimal fault under the WADC. Indeed, the panel used both a textualist and 
purposivist approach—a textualist approach to determine what the sanctions 
for the athletes should be and a purposivist approach to affirm its holdings.266 
Using a textual approach, the panel rejected the CBDA’s No Fault or 
Negligence ruling267 because a strict reading of DC10.5 explicitly forbids the 
elimination of a sanction where a contaminated supplement caused a positive 
test.268 As a result, the panel could not “eliminate” the athletes’ sanctions; 
instead, it had to operate under DC10.4, which prescribes a reprimand at the 
 
 261 2009 WADC, supra note 7, DC10.4, at 54–55. The second element requires the standard of 
“comfortable satisfaction.” Id. Comfortable satisfaction means more than the mere balance of probabilities but 
less than beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. DC3.1, at 26. 
 262 See Cielo, CAS 2011/A/2495, para. 3.4. 
 263 Id. paras. 3.4(i), 3.4(r)–(s). 
 264 Id. paras. 3.4(k), 3.4(t)–(u). 
 265 Id. para. 3.4(y). 
 266 Id. paras. 8.21–.24. See generally John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists From Purposivists?, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 70, 71, 84 (2006) (“[T]extualism . . . requires judges to treat the clear import of an enacted 
text as conclusive, even when the text fits poorly with its apparent background purposes 
[whereas] . . . purposivism is characterized by the conviction that judges should interpret a statute in a way that 
carries out its reasonably apparent purpose and fulfills its background justification . . . .”). 
 267 Cielo, CAS 2011/A/2495, para. 2.9. 
 268 Id. para. 8.31; see 2009 WADC, supra note 7, DC10.5.1 cmt., at 56–57. 
RATHGEBER GALLEYSPROOFS1 5/2/2013 9:28 AM 
1144 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26 
minimum and two years of ineligibility at the maximum.269 Hence, although 
the panel found the “slightest fault” on the athletes’ part, it had to issue a 
warning to Cielo, dos Santos, and Barbosa under the letter of DC10.4.270 
The panel’s alternative sanction for Waked evidences both the textualist 
approach and the purposivist justification. Due to Waked’s prior doping 
violation in 2010, his 2011 positive test was his second offense. Accordingly, 
although the panel found him to have the “slightest fault,” it had to evaluate his 
sanction pursuant to the table in DC10.7.271 Waked’s fault was nominal; 
therefore, the panel issued him the table’s minimal sanction—one year, thus 
comporting with the text of the WADC.272 But Waked’s sanction, when 
compared with his fellow respondents, was immense. Perhaps in response to 
this disparity, the panel justified its holding by reviewing the purpose behind 
the 2009 WADC revision: 
[T]he clear intention of the 2009 WADC (and its analogues) was to 
provide for greater, or harsher, sanctions in what are viewed as 
aggravating circumstances (such as multiple offences) whilst 
providing for flexibility and the lessening of sanctions in 
circumstances where, under the 2003 WADC, an Athlete, who was 
not a multiple offender, may have received what was considered to be 
an unduly harsh sanction.273 
Here, with one stroke, the panel simultaneously defended Waked’s sanction as 
consistent with the purpose of the revised WADC and reminded naysayers 
that, under the revised WADC, the panel possessed greater discretion when 
issuing sanctions for athletes who were not multiple offenders. This 
justification might have been a premeditated response to critics who may have 
questioned how, despite similar circumstances, Jessica Hardy could receive a 
one-year period of ineligibility, while Cielo and his two teammates could walk 
away with a mere warning. 
In summary, the panel reached a fair holding in Cielo. Given the 
overwhelming amount of evidence Cielo offered to prove his (and Dr. 
Magliocca’s) due diligence, the panel imposed appropriate sanctions, all of 
which comported with the text and purpose of the 2009 WADC. 
 
 269 2009 WADC, supra note 7, DC10.4 cmt., at 54–55. 
 270 Cielo, CAS 2011/A/2495, para. 8.31. 
 271 See 2009 WADC, supra note 7, DC10.7, at 66–70. 
 272 Cielo, CAS 2011/A/2495, para. 8.46. 
 273 Id. para. 8.41. 
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B. Improving the WADC: Defining “Medication” and “Supplement” 
Cielo’s importance is not limited to its holding; indeed, the decision 
demonstrates how crucial it is to define terms in a regulatory document. Before 
considering any sanctions, the panel had to decide the threshold issue of 
whether prescription caffeine was a “medication” or a “supplement.” Out of 
context, the distinction seems trivial, but here, that distinction bore greatly on 
the eventual sanctions the athletes faced. 274 If the panel had determined that 
the caffeine was a “medication,” then the panel could have evaluated the 
athletes under DC10.5.1,275 and their sanction could have been eliminated. 
Accordingly, all of the athletes, including Waked, would have escaped any 
punishment under the WADC. Clearly, the panel’s classification of caffeine as 
a supplement had a substantial impact on the outcome of the case. 
Although the CAS hears cases concerning positive drug tests from 
allegedly contaminated supplements every year,276 the WADC has never 
defined the terms “medication” or “supplement.”277 With vast differences in 
sanctions riding on the classification of a substance such as caffeine, WADA 
should define both “medication” and “supplement.” Taking a cue from 
domestic law, the United States Code defines “medication” as a substance used 
in the “diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease.”278 
Comparatively, according to the statute, a supplement intends to “supplement 
the diet” and contains one or more of the following: a vitamin, mineral, herb or 
botanical, amino acid, a dietary substance, or a concentrate, metabolite, extract 
or combination of the aforementioned substances.279 From these definitions, 
the determinative factor between “medications” and “supplements” seems to 
be that “medications” are intended to be curative and more targeted toward 
curing or preventing disease. 
 
 274 2009 WADC, supra note 7, DC10.5.1 cmt., at 5657. 
 275 Of course, the Panel did determine that the athletes had a modicum of fault in this case, but this 
determination only came after they had decided the medication/supplement issue. Cielo is only used to 
demonstrate how important this threshold decision can be. 
 276 See, e.g., Cielo, CAS 2011/A/2495; World Anti-Doping Agency v. Hardy, CAS 2009/A/1870, Arbitral 
Award (Ct. Arb. Sport 2010), available at http://www.tas-cas.org/d2wfiles/document/4218/5048/0/Award2018 
7020FINAL.pdf; Vencill v. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, CAS 2003/A/484, Arbitral Award (Ct. Arb. Sport 
2004), available at http://www.usada.org/files/active/arbitration_rulings/arbitration_ruling_3_17_2004_ 
Vencill.pdf. 
 277 See 2009 WADC, supra note 7, app, at 128–35 (listing all the defined terms in the WADC). 
 278 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(B) (2006). The U.S. Code also defines drug as an article “intended to affect the 
structure or ay function of the body of man . . . .” Id. § 321(g)(1)(C). 
 279 Id. § 321(ff)(1). 
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Although these definitions help draw a distinction between the two 
products, defining substances in such narrow, “curative” terms creates 
concerns. First, there are substances, such as pure caffeine, that do not fit 
squarely within either category; it is not a vitamin, mineral or amino acid, but 
at the same time, it is not a curative substance in a traditional sense.280 Second, 
both the pharmaceutical and dietary supplement industries champion 
innovation, continuously pushing the boundaries of science to create new 
products for consumers.281 As new products are created, fairly rigid definitions 
can become outdated quickly. 
Based on these concerns, this Comment advocates that WADA should 
incorporate a factor-based definition of “medication” and “supplement,” 
codifying the criteria the panel used in Cielo. These factors included the 
substance’s availability, form, and curative effect, as well as its public 
perception and whether a prescription is necessary to obtain it.282 None of these 
factors should be dispositive; rather, a panel should consider each to determine 
whether a substance should classify as a medication or supplement. Although a 
factor-based test would not foster stability and predictability the way a bright-
line test would, this test would remedy the problem of having static definitions 
in the face of new products and medicines that may blur the line between 
“medication” and “supplement.” Additionally, this test would provide anti-
doping adjudicatory bodies with a starting point for their analysis, thus creating 
a consistent approach to the question that would, in turn, lead to consistent 
findings on the merits. 
C. Redrafting DC10.4 and DC10.5 
Cielo exposed two weaknesses in DC10, both of which are contained in 
DC10.4 and DC10.5. First, DC10.4 suffers from imprecise drafting.283 Second, 
the WADC’s drafters placed too much importance on what substance caused 
an athlete’s failed drug test.284 Considering these points independently, this 
Subpart argues that DC10.4 and DC10.5 need redrafting to remedy their 
inherent flaws. 
 
 280 Cielo, CAS 2011/A/2495, para. 8.18 (stating that caffeine is not a “curative or healing substance”). 
 281 See Bernard Munos, Lessons from 60 Years of Pharmaceutical Innovation, 8 NATURE REVS. DRUG 
DISCOVERY 959, 959–68 (2009) (documenting innovation in pharmaceuticals from 1950 to 2008). 
 282 Cielo, CAS 2011/A/2495, paras. 8.15, 8.18. 
 283 See id. para. 2.9. 
 284 See 2009 WADC, supra note 7, DC10.4–.5, at 54–62. 
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DC10.4’s imprecise language stems from its use of the word “elimination.” 
“Elimination” appears not only in DC10.4’s title285 but also in its body.286 
Although its language suggests that an athlete’s sanction may be eliminated, 
DC10.4 expressly provides that an athlete may receive “[a]t a minimum, a 
reprimand and no period of Ineligibility from future Events, and at a maximum, 
two (2) years of Ineligibility.”287 Thus, under DC10.4, an athlete cannot escape 
all punishment. Instead, at a minimum, an adjudicatory body must issue a 
warning. Lessening a two-year period of ineligibility to a warning is a 
reduction; it is not an elimination. To eliminate is “to get rid of” or 
“remove,”288 and the text states that a sanction cannot be removed in DC10.4. 
To a casual reader, the inclusion of “elimination” may seem 
inconsequential, but it confuses terminology that has substantial effects on 
athletes’ rights. If an athlete has her sanction eliminated, “the anti-doping rule 
violation shall not be considered a violation for . . . determining the period of 
Ineligibility for multiple violations under Article 10.7.”289 For instance, in 
Cielo’s case, if the panel had eliminated his sanction, his record today would 
be clean. Instead, because of his warning, his situation is comparable to 
Waked’s prior to the CAS hearing. If Cielo tests positive for any substance in 
the future, he faces sanction under DC10.7, and he will be unable to escape a 
period of ineligibility regardless of his fault. The consequences of having a 
sanction eliminated and reduced are vastly different; therefore, WADA must 
expunge “elimination” from DC10.4 to provide clearer instructions for 
adjudicatory bodies around the world. 
In addition to its imprecise drafting, DC10 also places too much emphasis 
on what kind of banned substance an athlete possesses. As explained in Part 
III.A, when determining whether an athlete’s case warrants a reduced sanction, 
an adjudicatory body must apply DC10.4 or 10.5.290 If DC10.4 applies, a panel 
may reduce a sanction to a warning.291 However, if DC10.5 applies, a panel 
may only reduce the sanction by up to “one-half of the period of Ineligibility 
 
 285 Id. DC10.4, at 54 (“Elimination or Reduction of the Period of Ineligibility for Specified Substances 
under Specific Circumstances.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 286 Id., at DC10.5, at 55 (“To justify any elimination or reduction . . . .”). 
 287 Id. 
 288 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 598 (Houghton Mifflin Co., 3d ed. 1992). 
 289 2009 WADC, supra note 7, DC10.5.1, at 56. 
 290 See 2009 WADC, supra note 7, DC10.4–.5 at 54–62. This statement only applies to athletes who are 
facing sanction under the WADC for the first time. Athletes who are facing sanction for the second or third 
times are subject to DC 10.7. See id. DC7.1–7.3, at 66–68. 
 291 Id. DC10.4, at 54–55. 
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otherwise applicable” unless the athlete can prove No Fault or Negligence, an 
extremely high standard.292 Under DC10.2 the period of ineligibility imposed 
for a first-time violation is two years;293 therefore, the likely best scenario for 
an athlete whom a panel evaluates under DC10.5 is a one-year period of 
ineligibility. Jessica Hardy suffered such a fate under the 2003 WADC.294 
Because of such a wide disparity between the sanctions under DC10.4 and 
10.5, most athletes with No Significant Fault or Negligence would prefer that 
their case be subject to DC10.4 rather than 10.5.295 But in most cases where an 
athlete can prove how a substance entered her body and that it was not 
intended to improve her performance, she cannot control whether she 
possessed a “specified substance” or a substance on the Prohibited List. What 
kind of substance she possessed, however, determines whether her case is 
evaluated under DC10.4.296 
Limiting access to DC10.4 to only those athletes who possessed “specified 
substances” exposes a flaw in the WADC. Every year, athletes test positive for 
taking a contaminated supplement or from taking a drug from a physician who 
does not understand the WADC’s parameters.297 Do these athletes choose what 
 
 292 Id. DC10.5.2, at 57. 
 293 Id. DC10.2, at 52. 
 294 See World Anti-Doping Agency v. Hardy, CAS 2009/A/1870, Arbitral Award, para. 124 (Ct. Arb. 
Sport 2010), available at http://www.wada-ama.org/Documents/World_Anti-Doping_Program/WADP-
Legal_Library/Case_Law/WADP-Case-Law-2/CAS-2009-A-1870-Hardy.pdf. Notably, Hardy’s case was 
adjudicated under the 2003 WADC. The outcome of her case, however, is still relevant to this discussion 
because the texts of DC10.5.1 No Significant Fault or Negligence are the same in both the 2003 and 2009 
WADC. Compare 2009 WADC, supra note 7, DC10.5, 56–62, with 2003 WADC, supra note 72, art. 10.5, 
29–32. 
 295 This statement assumes that the athlete does not qualify for complete elimination of a sanction under 
DC10.5.1 No Fault or Negligence. Such an outcome would usually be a best-case scenario; however, few 
athletes meet the standard of DC10.5.1. The comment to DC10.5.1 explains just how difficult this standard is. 
The comment describes only one situation in which DC10.5.1 applies: where an athlete can prove that, despite 
all due care, she was sabotaged by a competitor. Further, the comment expressly prohibits application of 
DC10.5.1 in three common scenarios: (1) positive test resulting from a mislabeled or contaminated 
supplement; (2) administration of a “prohibited substance” by the athlete’s personal physician; and (3) 
sabotage by an athlete’s spouse or coach. The third scenario is particularly telling when juxtaposed with the 
comment’s earlier statement that DC10.5.1 would apply where an athlete could prove that, despite due care, 
she was sabotaged by a competitor. Drawing a distinction between different forms of sabotage highlights the 
narrow circumstances where DC10.5.1 might apply. It seems that the WADC’s architects want to create an 
expressio unius exception that only applies in the most unjust of circumstances. 2009 WADC, supra note 7, 
DC10.5.1 cmt., at 56–57. 
 296 Id. DC10.4. (“Where an Athlete or other Person can establish how a Specified Substance entered his or 
her body . . . .”) (emphasis omitted). 
 297 See, e.g., Fédération Internationale de Natation v. Cielo, CAS 2011/A/2495, Arbitral Award, paras. 
2.3, 2.6 (Ct. Arb. Sport 2011), available at http://www.tas-cas.org/d2wfiles/document/5094/5048/0/CAS20249 
RATHGEBER GALLEYSPROOFS1 5/2/2013 9:28 AM 
2012] GOLD MEDALIST TO CHEATER 1149 
substance will cause them to test positive? In most cases, the answer is no. The 
WADC, however, boxes athletes into different categories based on one factor 
that is beyond their control. If the Anna Terra Pharmacy had been filling 
prescriptions containing an anabolic agent instead of furosemide, Cielo would 
have likely suffered a year of ineligibility, possibly banning him from the 2012 
Olympic Games. Likewise, if Melnychenko’s doctor had prescribed a 
substance containing clenbuterol instead of furosemide, Melnychenko would 
have suffered at least a year of ineligibility. These hypothetical situations 
expose a fundamental inequity in the WADC—regardless of an athlete’s intent 
or due diligence, she may face a minimum sanction of a warning in some cases 
and a minimum sanction of one year of ineligibility in another—it all depends 
on one factor that is outside of her control. 
In theory, distinguishing between “specified substances” and substances on 
the Prohibited List seems consistent with the revised WADC’s goals of 
flexibility and harsher, stricter sanctions. Not only, in WADA’s words, is there 
a greater likelihood that “specified substances” “could be susceptible to a 
credible, non-doping explanation,” but substances on the Prohibited List 
generally affect the body’s physiology to improve athlete performance.298 
Accordingly, athletes who test positive for a substance on the Prohibited List 
probably gained a competitive advantage and likely do not have a credible 
explanation for use. Consider, however, the plethora of cases that the CAS has 
heard regarding contaminated supplements.299 Athletes in these cases may 
have gained an unfair athletic advantage over competitors, but that advantage 
could have been slight or nonexistent, as the substance could have appeared in 
extremely small amounts. Indeed, modern doping tests can detect even the 
slightest amounts of a banned substance in a biological system.300 Further, the 
athlete could have provided an explanation for her use by confirming through 
an accredited third party that her supplement was contaminated through no 
fault of her own.301 
Of course, the WADC notifies all athletes of its strict liability principle—
that an athlete has a duty to ensure no banned substance enters her body. This 
 
520249620249720249820Award20FINAL20292007202011.pdf; Hardy, CAS 2009/A/1870, paras. 12–13; 
Vencill v. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, CAS 2003/A/484, Arbitral Award, para. 11 (Ct. Arb. Sport 2004), 
available at http://www.usada.org/files/active/arbitration_rulings/arbitration_ruling_3_17_2004_Vencill.pdf. 
 298 2009 WADC, supra note 7, DC10.4 cmt., at 54–55. 
 299 See supra note 297. 
 300 See, e.g., Vencill, CAS 2003/A/484, para. 5. 
 301 See Vencill Was Suspended Two Years, Missed Olympics, ESPN, http://sports.espn.go.com/oly/news/ 
story?id=2059714 (last updated May 13, 2005). 
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Comment does not wish to abandon strict liability; instead, it advocates 
redrafting DC10 in light of the modern-day reality that the vast majority of 
modern athletes ingest supplements despite WADA’s persistent warnings that 
up to twenty percent of supplements may contain substances that are not listed 
on the label.302 Statistics on supplement use are rare; however, the studies that 
have been performed confirm the rising prevalence of supplements among 
international athletes. For example, at the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, thirty-nine 
percent of Canadian athletes reported consuming nutritional supplements; four 
years later, at the Sydney Olympics, that number had climbed to forty-seven 
percent.303 Another study found, at the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the number of 
athletes using supplements had surged to ninety percent of all Olympic 
athletes.304 The psychological and economic reasons for such high use are 
outside the scope of this Comment;305 such high use, however, indicates that 
athletes are willing to risk using a potentially contaminated supplement to 
remain competitive in the sport. 
Because of the prevalence of supplement use among modern athletes, the 
next version of the WADC should eliminate the schism between “specified 
substances” and “prohibited substances.” If an athlete tests positive for a 
substance found in a contaminated substance, she should not have to face a 
lengthier period of ineligibility solely based on the molecular composition of 
the contaminant. DC10.4’s text, save the “specified substances” aspect, should 
be incorporated into DC10.5.1 to give adjudicatory bodies the discretion to 
issue a sanction that spans anywhere from a reprimand to a two-year period of 
ineligibility for a first offense.306 Such a provision would still reflect the 2009 
WADC’s goal of providing flexibility for reducing sanctions where they would 
otherwise be unduly harsh. 
 
 302 Dietary Supplements: Q&A, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/ 
document/ds_english.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2012). 
 303 Shih-Han (Susan) Huang et al., The Use of Dietary Supplements and Medications by Canadian 
Athletes at the Atlanta and Sydney Olympic Games, 16 CLINICAL J. SPORT MED. 1, 29–30 (2006). 
 304 Dietary Supplements Win Olympic Gold, FOODNAVIGATOR-USA.COM (Sept. 15, 2008), http://www. 
foodnavigator-usa.com/Business/Dietary-supplements-win-Olympic-gold. 
 305 For discussion on the possible reasons why athletes consume supplements, see Huang et al., supra note 
303, at 31. 
 306 Within this analysis, a panel should consider whether an athlete received a significant physiological 
advantage over her competitors due to consumption of the banned substance. Such a consideration should be 
based on the type of substance an athlete tested positive for and the concentration of that substance in the 
athlete’s body. Presumably, a higher concentration would lead to a more substantial advantage and thus 
warrant a stronger sanction in light of the unfairness that worked against her competitors. 
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Critics may argue that this clause would grant adjudicatory bodies too 
much discretion, possibly leading to inconsistent rulings throughout the world. 
This concern is credible, particularly given that local tribunals, which are not 
as impartial or familiar with the WADC as the CAS, usually administer a 
ruling in the first instance.307 WADA and IFs have the power to appeal a 
decision in the CAS. The CAS, however, is an independent body and reviews 
all cases de novo.308 With such authority to review all facts and law before it, 
the CAS will ensure that appropriate sanctions are administered under the 
WADC. Therefore, although the number of appeals to the CAS may increase if 
WADA redrafted DC10.4 and DC10.5.1 into one article, the problem of 
inconsistent judgments would likely not come to fruition. 
D. CAS Should Discuss Precedent in Every Case. 
When the panel issued its ruling in Cielo, discontent and confusion swept 
through the international swimming community. Some athletes decried Cielo 
for cheating; others criticized a broken anti-doping system.309 There are many 
factors that may have caused these reactions—personal vendettas against Cielo 
and previous bad experiences with doping authorities are just a few. This 
Subpart, however, assumes that most athletes were dissatisfied or confused 
because they did not understand the ruling in light of previous decisions. To 
improve public comprehension of the WADC, which even reputable 
authorities misinterpret,310 CAS panels should explain their reasoning more 
thoroughly by discussing precedent in every published decision. Not only will 
this elucidate the panel’s reasoning in a particular case, but it will also clarify 
standards under the WADC. 
Although it reached a fair decision in Cielo, the panel missed an 
opportunity to justify its holding by discussing precedent. In particular, the 
panel should have compared Hardy and Cielo. Although they were adjudicated 
 
 307 See supra Part I.B–C. 
 308 See, e.g., Doping Auth. Neth. v. Zuijkerbuijk, CAS 2009/A/2012, Arbitral Award, para. 34 (Ct. Arb. 
Sport 2010), available at http://www.tas-cas.org/d2wfiles/document/4329/5048/0/Award202012.pdf. 
 309 See supra Introduction. 
 310 See, e.g., Fédération Internationale de Natation v. Cielo, CAS 2011/A/2495, Arbitral Award, para. 2.9 
(Ct. Arb. Sport 2011), available at http://www.tas-cas.org/d2wfiles/document/5094/5048/0/CAS20249520249 
620249720249820Award20FINAL20292007202011.pdf (noting that the CBDA’s decision was “internally 
inconsistent and in error”); Braden Keith, Zero-Hour is Thursday Morning for Cielo, Brazilian Doping 
Scandal, SWIM SWAM (July 20, 2011), http://swimswam.com/2011/07/zero-hour-is-thursday-morning-for-
cielo-brazilian-doping-scandal/ (“I can’t see any clear contradiction of the rules or precedents in the CBDA’s 
decision.”). 
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under different versions of the WADC, both cases featured similar fact patterns 
involving contaminated supplements and world record-holding swimmers. 
Instead of comparing the exigencies of the cases, however, the panel justified 
its holding in Cielo by referring to the factual findings set out in a separate 
section and concluding: “[T]he ‘fault’ of the Athletes is at the very lowest end 
of the spectrum . . . .”311 From a reader’s perspective, this statement was 
dissatisfactory for two reasons. First, the panel failed to reiterate any key facts 
of the case that would have validated the holding. Second, although the word 
“spectrum” implies a continuum on which there exist points of reference, the 
panel never referenced another case that may have served as a point of 
reference. Had the panel reiterated key facts in comparison to Hardy, its 
holding would have been more digestible to the general public, particularly 
members of the swimming community who were wondering how Cielo could 
receive only a warning when Hardy had suffered a year of ineligibility. If such 
a comparison had been made, the public would have better understood that the 
athletes were held to different legal standards and that Cielo had taken more 
precautionary measures than Hardy prior to ingesting the caffeine.312 
In addition to substantiating its decision, the comparison would have also 
clarified the WADC, particularly the phrase “degree of fault.” This phrase did 
not appear in the 2003 WADC; the drafters inserted it when they gave 
adjudicatory bodies greater discretion for sanctioning first-time offenders.313 In 
the 2009 WADC, however, the drafters offered no guidance for how to assess 
“degree of fault” besides the fact that the “circumstances considered must be 
specific and relevant to explain the Athlete’s . . . departure from the expected 
standard of behavior.”314 Because of these amorphous instructions, 
adjudicatory bodies could consider hundreds of factors to determine where on 
the spectrum of fault an athlete lies. If the panel had gone a step further and 
compared key facts in Cielo to key facts in another “degree of fault” case, the 
panel could have clarified the WADC by explaining what factors are most 
important in this assessment and what weight each factor has. In turn, this 
 
 311 Cielo, CAS 2011/A/2495, para. 8.24. 
 312 Compare Cielo, CAS 2011/A/2495, para. 3.4, with World Anti-Doping Agency v. Hardy, CAS 
2009/A/1870, Arbitral Award, para. 112 (Ct. Arb. Sport 2010), available at http://www.wada-ama.org/ 
Documents/World_Anti-Doping_Program/WADP-Legal_Library/Case_Law/WADP-Case-Law-2/CAS-2009-
A-1870-Hardy.pdf. 
 313 Compare 2003 WADC, supra note 72, art. 10.3, at 27–28, with 2009 WADC, supra note 7, DC10.4, at 
5455. 
 314 2009 WADC, supra note 7, DC10.4 cmt., at 54–55. 
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information would have created a more predictable legal system by advancing 
a coherent corpus of law.315 
In response to this argument, critics may point out that discussion of case 
law in the CAS is moot because the Court does not recognize the principle of 
stare decisis. Although the CAS has not adopted stare decisis, its panels 
nonetheless increasingly rely on previous decisions when crafting rulings. 
According to data compiled by Professor Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, one in 
six CAS cases between 1986 and 2003 cited prior cases, but since 2003, 
“nearly every award contains one or more references to earlier CAS 
awards.”316 A CAS panel has even explicitly stated, “[It] will obviously try, if 
the evidence permits, to come to the same conclusion on matters of law as a 
previous CAS Panel.”317 Clearly, the statistics and anecdotal evidence indicates 
a shift toward embracing precedent. CAS panels should continue this practice 
such that every doping case features a comparison of facts to prior decisions. 
The CAS’s discussion of previous cases is particularly significant due to 
interplay between WADA and the CAS. On one hand, WADA studies, 
considers, and integrates CAS jurisprudence into iterations of the WADC. On 
the other hand, the CAS shapes and refines the contours of the law through 
analysis of the issues before it. In light of this interplay, the CAS should 
discuss precedent in every case, especially high profile cases such as Cielo.318 
Not only will it lead to a better ruling on the merits, but it will also help 
progress anti-doping jurisprudence, providing clarity and predictability to a 
specialized, burgeoning legal system. 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment ends where it began, with the story of César Cielo. Four 
days after the CAS panel reached its decision, Cielo returned to competition at 
 
 315 Some scholars refer to the CAS’s corpus of law as the lex sportiva. For a detailed discussion of the 
term and the potential problems with using it, see Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 64, at 365. 
 316 Id. 
 317 Id. (quoting Int’l Assoc. Athletics Fed’ns v. Y., CAS 2004/A/628, Arbitral Award, para. 73 (Ct. Arb. 
Sport 2008), http://jurisprudence.tas-cas.org/sites/CaseLaw/Shared%20Documents/628.pdf). 
 318 In Cielo, the Panel dismissed a discussion of precedent as irrelevant to the factual and legal issues at 
hand. Fédération Internationale de Natation v. Cielo, CAS 2011/A/2495, Arbitral Award, para. 8.33 (Ct. Arb. 
Sport 2011), http://www.tas-cas.org/d2wfiles/document/5094/5048/0/CAS20249520249620249720249820 
Award20FINAL20292007202011.pdf. But the CAS had previously considered cases regarding the “degree of 
fault” standard, which could have served as a point of comparison. See, e.g., Doping Auth. Neth. v. 
Zuijkerbuijk, CAS 2009/A/2012, Arbitral Award, para. 41, available at http://www.tas-cas.org/d2wfiles/ 
document/4329/5048/0/Award202012.pdf. 
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the World Championships in Shanghai, China. In the face of intense scrutiny 
from the press and his competitors, Cielo captured gold in the fifty-meter 
butterfly.319 Defiant in victory, he jumped on the lane-line and flexed his 
biceps for the media, but, in stark contrast to his gold medal at the 2008 
Olympics, he immediately became overwhelmed—his brow furrowed, his head 
lowered, and he sobbed uncontrollably into the water as his competitors 
cleared the pool.320 Shortly after the race, he waxed, “This gold medal has a 
different feel from the other ones. This one was the hardest of my life . . . . It 
was a tough time. Time to test not only my talent but how much I could 
take.”321 Clearly, the doping ordeal had weighed heavily on his psyche. 
If there is a silver lining to Cielo’s story, it is the fact that he was rightfully 
sanctioned with a warning under the WADC, and he was able to compete at the 
2012 London Olympics where he won bronze in the fifty-meter freestyle.322 As 
the WADC is revised, hopefully more athletes with minimal fault will receive 
warnings rather than suffer a period of ineligibility. After all, one of WADA’s 
stated goals in its 2009 revision of the WADC was to balance effective anti-
doping enforcement with fairness for athletes who may have ingested without 
intending to enhance performance.323 
From time to time, however, WADA has lost sight of this goal. On 
February 6, 2012, John Fahey, the president of WADA, made an unnecessarily 
extreme statement to the press. In response to a CAS panel sanctioning 2010 
Tour de France winner Alberto Contador324 to two years of ineligibility, Fahey 
said:  
The simple fact is that anyone who has a prohibited substance in their 
[sic] system is a cheat. It is as simple as that. The only argument then 
comes as to what was the nature of how the prohibited substance got 
 
 319 Controversial Cesar Cielo Takes Gold in 50m Butterfly, NATIONAL (July 26, 2011), http://www. 
thenational.ae/sport/other-sport/controversial-cesar-cielo-takes-gold-in-50m-butterfly. 
 320 Id. (describing photograph). 
 321 Id. 
 322 Olympics Swimming: Florent Manaudou Wins Shock Gold, BBC SPORT (Aug. 3, 2012), http://www. 
bbc.co.uk/sport/0/olympics/18916967. 
 323 Ensuring a Level Playing Field, supra note 161, at 5. 
 324 For information on Contador’s case, see World Anti-Doping Agency v. Contador, CAS 2011/A/2386, 
Arbitral Award (Ct. Arb. Sport 2012), available at http://www.tas-cas.org/d2wfiles/document/5648/5048/0/ 
FINAL20AWARD202012.02.06.pdf. 
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into the athlete’s system. But you’re a cheat, effectively, the moment 
you’ve got that substance in there.325  
Although the WADC’s strict liability principle implicates an athlete as guilty 
of an anti-doping violation when she tests positive for a banned substance, 
Fahey’s oversimplification of the adjudication process both misrepresents the 
tribunals’ actual inquiries and undermines WADA’s broader goals. 
Undoubtedly, WADA is committed to catching cheaters, but its broader goal, 
which is stated at the beginning of the 2009 WADC, is preserving the “spirit of 
the sport.”326 Preserving the “spirit of the sport” should include enforcing anti-
doping sanctions against a WADC violator and offering a fair hearing for an 
athlete who may have ingested a banned substance through no fault of her 
own. One may question whether Lance Armstrong received a “fair hearing” in 
summer 2012 when USADA instituted a lifetime ban against Armstrong 
despite the fact that he never failed a drug test.327 
Armstrong aside, in recent years, WADA has taken affirmative strides 
toward reaching this goal but still must improve in several ways. The 2009 
revisions of the WADC took a step in the right direction by providing 
adjudicatory bodies with greater discretion to determine applicable sanctions 
for athletes who had violated the WADC. To help protect the “spirit of the 
sport” in the future, WADA should adopt the changes that this Comment 
advocates during its next process for amendment and review. These changes 
include defining the terms “medication” and “supplement,” eliminating the 
dichotomy between DC10.4 and 10.5, and encouraging the CAS to adopt a 
consistent practice of discussing precedent when drafting opinions. Together, 




 325 Wada President: Alberto Contador Is a ‘Cheat,’ ESPN, http://espn.go.com/olympics/cycling/story/_/ 
id/7550222/alberto (last updated Feb. 7, 2012). 
 326 2009 WADC, supra note 7, at 14. 
 327 Press Release, U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, Lance Armstrong Receives Lifetime Ban and 
Disqualification of Competitive Results for Doping Violations Stemming from His Involvement in the United 
States Postal Service Pro-Cycling Team Doping Conspiracy (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.usada.org/files/ 
active/resources/press_releases/Press%20Release-Armstrong%20-August%202012.pdf. 
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that is fairer, more predictable, and more understandable for the greater 
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APPENDIX 
FIGURE 1: Textual Comparison of Sanctions under the 2003 and 2009 WADC 
 







A Prohibited Substance is 
“[a]ny substance so described 
on the Prohibited List.” 
(Definitions section).“The 
Prohibited List may identify 
specified substances . . . which 
are less likely to be successfully 
abused as doping agents.” 
(Article 10.3).  
“[A]ll Prohibited 
Substances shall be 
“Specified Substances” 
except substances in the 
classes of anabolic 
agents and hormones and 
those stimulants and 
hormone antagonists and 
modulators so identified 









“[T]he period of Ineligibility 
imposed for a violation of 
Article 2.1 (presence of 
Prohibited Substance or its 
Metabolites or Markers) . . . 
shall be:  
 
First violation: Two (2) years’ 
Ineligibility. 
Second violation: Lifetime 
Ineligibility.” 
 
“The period of 
Ineligibility imposed for 
a violation of Article 2.1 
(Presence of Prohibited 
Substance or its 
Metabolites or 
Markers) . . . shall be as 
follows . . . :  
 






Possession of a 
Specified 
Substance 
“First violation: At a minimum, 
a warning and reprimand and no 
period of Ineligibility from 
future Events, and at a 
maximum, one (1) year’s 
Ineligibility. 
Second violation: Two (2) 
years’ Ineligibility. 
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minimum, a reprimand 
and no period of 
Ineligibility from future 
Events, and at a 
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“However, the Athlete . . . shall 
have the opportunity . . . to 
establish the basis for 
eliminating or reducing (in the 
case of a second or third 
violation) this sanction as 
provided in Article 10.5.” 
“To justify any 
elimination or reduction, 
the Athlete . . . must 
produce corroborating 
evidence . . . which 
establishes to the 
comfortable satisfaction 
of the hearing panel the 
absence of an intent to 
enhance sport 
performance or mask the 
Use of a performance-
enhancing substance. 
The Athlete’s . . . degree 
of fault shall be the 
criterion considered in 
assessing any reduction 
of the period of 
Ineligibility.” 
Article 10.5.2:  
Mitigating a 




“If an Athlete establishes in an 
individual case . . . that he or 
she bears No Significant Fault 
or Negligence, then the period 
of Ineligibility may be reduced, 
but the reduced period of 
Ineligibility may not be less 
than one-half of the minimum 
period of Ineligibility otherwise 
applicable.” 
“If an Athlete . . . 
establishes in an 
individual case that he or 
she bears No Significant 
Fault or Negligence, 
then the otherwise 
applicable period of 
Ineligibility may be 
reduced, but the reduced 
period of Ineligibility 
may not be less than one-









[None] “For a second anti-
doping rule violation the 
period of Ineligibility 
shall be within the range 
set forth in the table [in 
Article 10.7, which 
ranges from one-year 
ineligibility to a lifetime 
ban].” 
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GLOSSARY 
Abbreviation Full Designation 
AAA  American Arbitration Association 
CAS  Court of Arbitration for Sport 
CBDA  Confederação Brasileria de Desportos Aquáticos 
DC  Doping Code (used in conjunction with a specific 
article from the 2009 WADC) 
FIG  Fédération Internationale de Gymnastique 
FINA  Fédération Internationale de Natation 
IF   International Federation 
IOC  International Olympic Committee 
NADO National Anti-Doping Organization 
NF   National Federation 
NGB  National Governing Body 
NOC  National Olympic Committee 
WADA World Anti-Doping Agency 
WADC World Anti-Doping Code 
USADA United States Anti-Doping Agency 
USOC  United States Olympic Committee 
